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INTRODUCTION
Beginning in the mid-1980s and continuing throughout the early
1990s, a widely enforced city of Miami ordinance prohibited people
from sleeping in public and on the private property of others without
their consent.1 Around that time, there were roughly 6000 homeless
people, but only enough shelter space for fewer than 700 people.2
And these were the statistics before the first winds of Hurricane
Andrew began to blow and the first house collapsed. The storm
eventually ripped through the south of Florida on an unprecedented
path of destruction, leaving upwards of 200,000 people homeless in its
catastrophic aftermath.3 At the time the public-sleeping ordinance
was enforced, the vast majority of the city’s homeless population had
nowhere to sleep.4 It was impossible for them to obey the law.
In this Article, the central issue is how difficult—and sometimes
impossible—it can be for homeless people to obey the law on a
consistent basis, compared to those with access to housing, and why
this is objectionable. Examining this issue is of fundamental
importance because imposing laws which people may not be able to
consistently avoid breaking undermines the legitimacy of holding
people accountable for their behavior through punishment, disregards
their dignity and autonomy, and undermines the law.5
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1559 n.11 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
Id. at 1553, 1558.
Id. at 1158–59.
Id. at 1580–81.
See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE

PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 22–24 (2d ed. 2008).
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This Article is focused on prohibitions against conduct the
homeless may not be able to avoid engaging in as part of their
existence, such as sleeping in public, begging, and loitering.6 It is not
concerned with laws that are impossible for the entire population to
obey, which, as Lon Fuller once observed, “no sane lawmaker, not
even the most evil dictator, would have any reason to enact.”7
Instead, the analysis is more focused on the selective enforcement of
laws against the homeless and whether they may not be able to
avoid breaking certain laws that regulate conduct characteristic of
their condition.8
The law can be practically impossible for the homeless to obey in
three contexts. First, some individual laws—like the Miami city
ordinance mentioned earlier that banned sleeping in public—
comprehensively prohibit behaviors which homeless people cannot
avoid engaging in as part of their daily existence because of a lack of
alternatives that would make obeying the law possible.9
Second, in some cases, the law imposes narrow prohibitions against
certain behavior which, individually, may each be possible to obey.
However, the cumulative effects of these ordinances as well as
property laws can amount to the near-equivalent of a comprehensive
ban on prohibited activities where few legal alternatives exist.10 My
contention is that in such contexts it can be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, for the homeless to exist without being penalized even
though people with access to housing would have no such problems.

6. See Don Mitchell, The Annihilation of Space by Law: The Roots and
Implications of Anti-Homeless Laws in the United States, 29 ANTIPODE 303, 307
(1997); David M. Smith, Note, A Theoretical and Legal Challenge To Homeless
Criminalization as Public Policy, 12 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 487, 492 (1994).
7. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 70 (1964).
8. See Maria Foscarinis, Kelly Cunningham-Bowers & Kristen E. Brown, Out of
Sight-Out of Mind?: The Continuing Trend Toward the Criminalization of
Homelessness, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 145, 147 (1999); Tami Iwamoto,
Note, Adding Insult to Injury: Criminalization of Homelessness in Los Angeles, 29

WHITTIER L. REV. 515, 522–23 (2007).
9. See Smith, supra note 6, at 492 (citing examples of behaviors related to the
daily existence of homeless persons that are illegal).
10. See Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 295, 315–16 (1991); James Duncan, Editor’s Note, Men Without Property: The
Tramp’s Classification and the Use of Urban Space, THE URBAN SOCIOLOGY
READER 225 (Jan Lin & Christopher Mele eds., 2013) (discussing constant police
surveillance); see also Marie-Eve Sylvestre & Céline Bellot, Challenging
Discriminatory and Punitive Responses to Homelessness in Canada, ADVANCING
SOCIAL RIGHTS IN CANADA 171–72 (Martha Jackman & Bruce Porter eds., 2014)
(noting how the visibility of the homeless renders them more likely to be penalized).
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Third, quality of life offenses can regulate nearly every act the
homeless engage in, including their movement, presence in different
places, and even their sleep.11 Because the homeless are constantly in
the jurisdiction where these laws are enforced, it may be impossible
for them to avoid a selective or discretionary enforcement of the laws
against them, even though people with access to housing would not
have comparable difficulty.
This Article has four parts. Part I briefly examines why it is
important for individuals to be able to follow the laws to which they
are subjected. In light of those reasons, Part II looks at examples of
individual prohibitions that may be impossible to obey, including laws
comprehensively prohibiting sleeping in public, camping in public,
and panhandling. Part III demonstrates that the homeless may not be
able to avoid breaking cumulative individual prohibitions against
different conducts in addition to laws which are selectively enforced.
This Article concludes by considering the legal consequences of these
laws. Notably, in Part IV, I build on the work of Jeremy Waldron and
argue that the defense of necessity should generally not be invoked in
cases where it is practically impossible to obey the law.12 Rather,
invoking the issue of practical impossibility can be the foundation for
contesting the constitutionality of laws, can lead to granting
injunctions against the enforcement of laws disproportionately
affecting the homeless, and can stimulate policy change in how laws
are applied against the homeless.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING ABLE TO OBEY THE LAW
A. Impossibility, Autonomy, and Self-Determination
Discussions regarding the importance of being able to obey the law
can be traced as far back as Roman law.13 More recently, several
prominent contemporary legal theorists have addressed the issue in
different contexts. Lon Fuller has argued that a fundamental
characteristic of the law is that it should not require those subjected
to it to do, or refrain from doing, the impossible.14 In his view, the
11. See Iwamoto, supra note 8, at 522–23.
12. See generally Jeremy Waldron, Why Indigence Is Not a Justification, in FROM
SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE: POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL LAW (William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000) [hereinafter Why
Indigence Is Not a Justification].
13. See e.g., David Daube, Greek and Roman Reflections on Impossible Laws, 12
NAT’L L. F. 1, 4 (1967); Robert Henle, Principles of Legality: Qualities of Law—Lon
Fuller, St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Isidore of Seville, 39 AM. JURIS. 47, 60–62 (1994).
14. FULLER, supra note 7, at 162.
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issue of impossibility is not limited to laws which generally cannot be
observed by the entire population, but rather, adopting an individual
capacity-oriented approach, extends the principle to “rules that
require conduct beyond the powers of the affected party.”15 More
directly, he ties the importance of being able to obey the law to the
notions of autonomy and dignity.16
With respect to autonomy, in Fuller’s view the law ought to treat
individuals as responsible and autonomous agents, meaning that the
law recognizes their capacity to shape their own future and act as
rational agents in making decisions.17 This implies that the law must
recognize how individuals live their lives and shape their own futures
in accordance with the rules that guide the legality of their behavior.18
For example, H.L.A. Hart analogized the law to a choosing system in
which the population is informed of the rules in advance, made aware
of the consequences of breaking them, and punished for choosing to
violate them.19 In such a system, individual freedom is maximized
because people can weigh the consequences of breaking the law, with
the choice of doing so being left up to them.20 But when laws are
impossible to obey, people never know when they will be punished
and it makes it far more difficult to plan their lives.21 The fact that
breaking an impossible law is inevitable also makes the enforcement
of these rules a sort of unexpected ambush,22 where individuals lose
peace of mind as they wait to be punished for a situation they cannot
avoid. Such rules demean one’s capacity for self-determination
because they send the message that no matter how rationally one
behaves or how hard one tries to obey the rules in place, they will
inevitably fail and it can lead to negative consequences. Arresting or
punishing people for violating these types of rules implies that
individuals who are not able to obey the law are in fact making
conscious and rational choices to break it. To draw an analogy
described by Martha Nussbaum, the rules disingenuously treat those
who are starving as if they have food but are choosing to fast.23
15. FULLER, supra note 7, at 39.
16. Id. at 162.
17. Id. at 39, 162.
18. HART, supra note 5, at 22–23.
19. Id. at 22–23.
20. Id. at 23.
21. Id. at 23–24.
22. See John Gardner, Wrongs and Faults, APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 70
(A.P. Simester ed., 2005).
23. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 273, 289 (1997).
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Impossibility, Dignity, and Opportunities

That it is impossible for only some people—or certain groups of
people—to obey the law also raises important dignity-related
concerns. Dignity implies that all individuals have inherent worth as
members of the human community and are deserving of respect and
concern as moral beings.24 As Jeremy Waldron has argued, it can be
construed as a type of normative status recognizing the “high and
equal rank of every human person”25 and that people’s freedom
should not be limited as an unwilling means to the ends of others.26
Dignity is therefore closely tied to the notion of equality.27 For
instance, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that dignity is
an important aspect of the constitutional right to equal treatment
before the law.28 Dignity celebrates what makes individuals different
from one another and strives to treat them as equals, rather than
using these differences as a justification for treating them as if they
were less worthy of respect or concern.29 Together, the notions of
dignity and equality set a sort of floor for how people should be
treated in a way that recognizes their high value as rational human
beings of equal worth.30
If the law takes these notions seriously, it must recognize that there
are people in our society who do not have the same basic capacities
and opportunities to obey the law like everyone else.31 Hart famously
explained the moral objection to punishing those who did not have
the basic capacities (physical and mental) and opportunities to obey
the law when he argued:
What is crucial is that those whom we punish should have had, when
they acted, the normal capacities, physical and mental, for doing
what the law requires and abstaining from what it forbids, and a fair

24. See JEREMY WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK AND RIGHTS 49 (Meir Dan-Cohen
ed., 2012) (citing Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999]
1 S.C.R. 497, ¶ 51 (Can.)); Rex D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 66 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 65, 76 (2011) (describing Kant’s traditional notion of dignity).
25. WALDRON, supra note 24, at 14.
26. AHARON BARAK, HUMAN DIGNITY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 27–28 (2015).
27. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 198–99 (1977).
28. See Andrews v. Law Soc’y of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 171 (Can.) (finding the
constitutional right under Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11, § 15
(U.K.)); Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 571–72 (Can.) (same).
29. See Andrews, 1 S.C.R. 143 at 171.
30. WALDRON, supra note 24, at 29.
31. See HART, supra note 5, at 153.
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opportunity to exercise these capacities. Where these capacities and
opportunities are absent, as they are in different ways in the varied
cases of accident, mistake, paralysis, reflex action, coercion, insanity,
etc., the moral protest is that it is morally wrong to punish because
‘he could not have helped it’ or ‘he could not have done otherwise’
or ‘he had no real choice’.32

But there are other problems with impossible laws which extend
beyond the mere fact that the person cannot do what is asked of them
and it is wrong to blame them for acts they could not avoid engaging
in and that may be morally innocent in nature.33 Notably, I am
concerned with how requiring people to follow impossible rules
negatively impacts their dignity and equality interests. The fact that
someone does not have the basic capacities or opportunities to obey
the law like everyone else should not mean that they lose their dignity
or right to be treated equally; it should not detract from their inherent
worth as people or mean that they are less worthy of respect or
consideration.34 If lack of basic opportunities diminished a person’s
inherent value as a member of the human community, the law can be
used as a tool to allow the majority to act as masters over those with
fewer opportunities and who are perceived as less desirable.35 If one
accepts Nussbaum’s capabilities approach—where individuals must
benefit from certain capabilities in order to have a basic quality of life
as human beings36—the law should punish people for failing to avail
themselves of the basic opportunity to obey the law, instead of
punishing people for failing to have the basic opportunity to obey the
law.37
An important aspect of being a dignified member of the human
community also entails being able to stand up for oneself and assert
one’s rights in an unapologetic manner.38 The central problem with
impossible laws is that when a person stands up for themselves by
asserting their rights, demanding their inherent value as a rational
being be recognized, and morally protesting the fact that it is
32. HART, supra note 5, at 152.
33. See R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, at ¶¶ 29, 40 (Can.) (citing Perka v. The
Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232 (Can.)).
34. See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 18–19, 24 (2011).
35. BARAK, supra note 26, at 27–28.
36. NUSSBAUM, supra note 34, at 34.
37. A.P. Simester, A Disintegrated Theory of Culpability, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: THE LEGACY OF GLANVILLE WILLIAMS 184 (Dennis J.
Baker & Jeremy Horder eds., 2013) (making an analogous argument with respect to
capacity).
38. See WALDRON, supra note 24, at 29.
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impossible for them to obey the law even though other people have
no problem doing so, the operation of the law suggests that none of
this matters.39 As I argue throughout the Article, these types of laws
send a message that the life and preferences of those subjected to
impossible laws are worth less than those who are afforded basic
opportunities. Furthermore, as I discuss in Part II, trying to follow
certain rules when people do not have the capacities or opportunities
to obey them can in fact harm certain members of society as well as
disregard the sanctity of their life and security interests.40
C.

Lack of Fair Opportunities and Lack of Complementarity

My concern is that by precluding the homeless from engaging in
certain behaviors in public without the provision of reasonable and
legal alternatives, there is a lack of fair and consistent opportunity to
obey the law.41 Waldron has explored where the lack of a fair
opportunity for the homeless to obey the law stems from, concluding
that the combination of property law rules and quality of life offenses
result in the homeless being governed by the law differently than
people with access to housing.42 He argues that if everyone had
access to a home, it would be fair to regulate certain life-sustaining
conducts undertaken in public, such as urinating and sleeping,
because they could be restricted to the private realm.43 Because of
this possibility, public spaces could be regulated to preclude such
activities that were undertaken complementarily to activities that
those with homes would normally do in their own homes.44 This is
what Waldron calls the “Complementarity Thesis.”45 However, when
people have no access to private places because they are homeless,
they are not undertaking these life-sustaining conducts in a
complementary way. Rather, it can be the primary and only place
they can perform them.46 As a result, public spaces and the conduct
of the homeless must be regulated in light of this fundamental
difference: the lack of complementarity. In Waldron’s words:

39. FULLER, supra note 7, at 162–63.
40. See Victoria (City) v. Adams, [2009] 100 B.C.L.R. 4th 28, ¶ 110 (Can. B.C.).
41. See Waldron, supra note 10, at 322 (discussing homeless persons’ lack of fair
opportunity).
42. See Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and Community, 50 U. TORONTO L.J.
371, 397 (2000).
43. Id. at 394.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 395.
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Unfortunately, it is not appropriate for the regulation of public
places in a society where there are large numbers of homeless
people. In such a society, public spaces have to be regulated on a
somewhat different basis. They have to be regulated in light of the
recognition that some people have no private space - not even the
temporary privacy that public shelters or public toilets would afford
- to come out of or to return to. Fairness demands that public spaces
be regulated in light of the recognition that large numbers of people
have no alternative but to be and remain and live all their lives in
public. For such persons, there is an unavoidable failure of the
complementarity between the use of private space and the use of
public space, and unless we are prepared to embrace the most
egregious unfairness in the way our community polices itself in
public, we are simply not in a position to use that complementarity
as a basis for regulation.47

The lack of fair opportunity for the homeless to obey the law created
by the lack of complementarity between public and private also raises
important concerns relating to punishment for breaking impossible
laws. On the one hand, because a person could not choose to obey
the law even if they wanted, they risk being punished despite the fact
that they may be morally innocent.48 In light of this, retribution
cannot justify holding actors accountable through punishment in
these cases, because people do not deserve to be punished for
behavior they cannot avoid, or for which they are morally innocent.49
On the other hand, the problem with enforcing laws that people
cannot avoid breaking is that they fail in deterring the future breach
of the same rules.50 This is particularly the case with respect to
prohibitions against public acts that the homeless must do as part of
their existence and cannot avoid, such as sleeping or urinating. If a
person has nowhere to lawfully sleep or urinate but in public,
punishing them for doing these things in public will not prevent a
reoccurrence, even if the punishment is harsh.51 As a result, the
enforcement of these ordinances will necessarily be ineffective.52 As
one author has put it:
47. Id.
48. See e.g., R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299, 1310 (Can.); R. v. Ruzic,
[2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, ¶¶ 29, 40 (Can.).
49. See Smith, supra note 6, at 495–96.
50. See Maria Foscarinis, Downward Spiral: Homelessness and its
Criminalization, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 43 n.331 (1996).
51. See Smith, supra note 6, at 496 (citing Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp.
1551, 1565 (S.D. Fla. 1992)).
52. Jane B. Baron, Homelessness as a Property Problem, 36 URB. LAW. 273, 287
(2004).
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[A]n anti-camping ordinance, however well it passes muster under
existing law, will be flat out ineffective to stop public sleeping if
homeless people have no rights to be in private spaces. The same
can be said for statutes designed to regulate begging or loitering; the
effectiveness of such statutes will depend directly on whether
alternatives to the proscribed acts are realistically available.
Ordinances designed to eliminate or curtail behaviors found
offensive to those who are not homeless must deal with the options
that are, or more accurately, are not available to the homeless.53

II. INDIVIDUAL LAWS THAT CAN BE IMPOSSIBLE TO OBEY
Many individual laws only restrict certain behaviors of homeless
people in certain places or between specified times, and may be
entirely possible to obey.54 The concerns that I will address in this
section, however, relate to the extreme difficulty and impossibility in
obeying comprehensive bans—or bans which amount to
comprehensive prohibitions—on certain behaviors in which the
homeless inevitably engage as part of their existence because little or
no reasonable alternatives exist.55 These are cases of chronic
impossibility, where both the lack of alternatives and breach of legal
rules are persistent. In this section, I discuss two particular
comprehensive prohibitions: those that ban sleeping or camping in
public places and those that prohibit panhandling.
A. Anti-Public Sleeping Laws and Lack of Shelter

1.

Anti-Public Sleeping Laws

The first example of laws that can be impossible for the homeless
to obey on a consistent basis due to lack of alternatives involves
comprehensive bans on sleeping in public or public camping when
there is insufficient shelter space and access to housing. Every person
needs to sleep as part of her existence, and depriving oneself of sleep
is harmful.56 As Waldron argues, the impossibility of obeying

53. Id.
54. See

Jamie Michael Charles, Note, “America’s Lost Cause”: The
Unconstitutionality of Criminalizing Our Country’s Homeless Population, 18 B.U.

PUB. INT. L.J. 315, 319 (2009).
55. See e.g., NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, NO SAFE PLACE:
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 17–18 (2014) [hereinafter
NO SAFE PLACE].
56. Michelle A. Short & Siobhan Banks, The Functional Impact of Sleep
Deprivation, Sleep Restriction, and Sleep Fragmentation, SLEEP DEPRIVATION AND
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comprehensive bans against sleeping in public is largely rooted in a
lack of access to both public and private places where one can
lawfully sleep.57 To paraphrase his words, every act that a person
engages in has to be undertaken somewhere: either in public or on
private property.58 Homeless people may not have access to their
own private property or place where they can lawfully sleep. The
only way they can sleep on the private property of another is with the
owner’s permission,59 even though in some cases, the law forbids
staying on another’s private property even with permission. For
example, in Placerville, California, it is an offense for a property
owner to allow someone to camp on their private property for more
than five consecutive days, even with permission.60
If a person does not have access to his or her own private property
or the private property of another to lawfully sleep, their only option
is to sleep on public property.
However, when there is a
comprehensive ban on sleeping on public property, this option is also
removed.61 Because homeless people can neither sleep on private
property nor on public property, there may be nowhere they can
lawfully sleep—there may be no alternative. As one author has
noted, even though these laws appear to be neutral by banning public
sleeping for everyone, “the impact of these laws fall almost
exclusively on the homeless, because they are the only societal group
with no alternative to sleeping outdoors.”62 The cumulative effect of
the lack of possibility to sleep lawfully in either public or private
spaces is that the act of sleeping becomes entirely prohibited for the
homeless and effectively excludes them from the jurisdiction, even if
there is no law which comprehensively bans the activity in both public
and private.63
Cities have imposed comprehensive bans on sleeping in public even
though there was insufficient shelter space. This was the case with the

DISEASE: EFFECTS ON THE BODY, BRAIN AND BEHAVIOR 13 (Matt T. Bianchi ed.,
2014).
57. Waldron, supra note 10, at 315.
58. Id. at 296.
59. See id. at 304; see also Mitchell, supra note 6, at 310.
60. PLACERVILLE, CAL., CITY CODE, § 6-19-3 (2014); see also NO SAFE PLACE,
supra note 55, at 18 (citing the Placerville code).
61. See Waldron, supra note 10, at 315.
62. Charles, supra note 54, at 340.
63. See Waldron, supra note 42, at 397; see also Paul Ades, The

Unconstitutionality of “Antihomeless” Laws: Ordinances Prohibiting Sleeping in
Outdoor Public Areas as a Violation of the Right to Travel, 77 CAL. L. REV. 595,

618–19 (1989).
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Miami ordinance mentioned in the beginning of this Article, which
prohibited sleeping “on any of the streets, sidewalks, public places or
upon the private property of another without the consent of the
owner thereof.”64 At the time when the ordinance was enforced,
between 500 and 700 of the city’s 6000 homeless people had access to
shelter space.65 Even when the city of Miami stopped enforcing the
ordinance prohibiting public sleeping after another Florida court
“called into question the validity of a similar ordinance,”66 arrest
records showed that the police began selectively enforcing trespass,
loitering, and park closure ordinances to arrest and punish people
who slept in public.67 The ordinance was eventually challenged in a
class action suit in Pottinger v. Miami.68 The plaintiffs who
represented the nearly 6000 homeless people in the city claimed that
the ordinances violated their Eighth Amendment rights and resulted
in cruel and unusual punishment because they had no alternatives but
to sleep in public and had not chosen to be homeless.69 They also
argued that the laws violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to
equal protection.70
The court recognized that the state of homelessness was rarely, if
ever, chosen and accepted.71 Expert evidence showed that it was the
result of different factors beyond a person’s control, including
financial difficulties, as well as mental and physical illnesses.72 The
court also noted that the ordinances were overbroad in that they
allowed the homeless to be arrested for “harmless, inoffensive
conduct that they are forced to undertake in public places.”73
Ultimately, the court in Pottinger concluded that the city’s practice of
arresting the homeless for engaging in innocent acts like sleeping in
public constituted a cruel and unusual punishment and violated a

64. See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1559 n.11 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
Moreover, the city also mandated the closing of parks between 10 PM and 7 AM. See
id. at 1560 n.12.
65. See id. at 1564. Notably, although there were approximately 700 beds in the
city’s homeless shelters, 200 were reserved for people who qualified through certain
programs. Id.
66. Id. at 1558 n.8 (citing Hershey v. City of Clearwater, 834 F.2d 937, 940 (11th
Cir. 1987)).
67. Id. at 1566–67.
68. See generally id.
69. Id. at 1561.
70. Id. at 1578.
71. Id. at 1563–64.
72. Id. at 1558, 1564–65.
73. Id. at 1577.
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person’s right to equal protection under the law.74 Moreover, the
court enjoined the city from arresting the homeless and from
enforcing laws that punish the homeless for innocent public conduct,
beyond their control, which they must engage in as part of their
existence.75 Following the decision, a settlement referred to as the
“Pottinger Agreement” was reached which prevented violations
based on “life-sustaining conduct” except in certain circumstances
where available alternatives to the conduct were made known to the
homeless person and that person refused it.76
A similar law which comprehensively banned public sleeping
existed in Los Angeles until it was struck down as unconstitutional in
2006.77 The next year, a settlement was reached which limited its
enforcement between certain hours.78 The ordinance originally
stated: “No person shall sit, lie or sleep in or upon any street,
sidewalk or other public way,” and made it an offense punishable by a
$1000 fine or six months in prison.79 At the time, there were roughly
1000 more homeless people than available shelter spaces in Skid Row
alone.80 In the entire county of Los Angeles, there were roughly
50,000 more homeless people than available beds.81 Despite these
cases, some American cities continue to prohibit sleeping in public.
According to the National Law Center on Homelessness and
Poverty (NLCHP), roughly eighteen percent of American cities
impose city-wide bans on public sleeping.82 For example, a Dallas
ordinance states: “A person commits an offense if he . . . sleeps or
dozes in a street, alley, park, or other public place.”83 Although the
law was originally struck down as unconstitutional in 1994 because

74. Id. at 1583–84. Notably, the court concluded that ordinances which punish
acts like public sleeping and eating when the individual has nowhere else to go violate
the individual’s fundamental right to travel. Id. at 1580.
75. Id. at 1584.
76. See generally History of the Pottinger Agreement, ACLU OF FLA.,
https://aclufl.org/pottinger/history [https://perma.cc/X45X-4FQM]. Following the
Pottinger Agreement, a homeless person can only be ticketed for life-sustaining
conduct if a shelter has available space, the person was offered access to that shelter,
refused to go, and subsequently committed one of the listed offenses. Id.
77. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 2006).
78. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007).
79. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1123.
80. Id. at 1122.
81. Id.
82. NO SAFE PLACE, supra note 55, at 7.
83. DALLAS, TEX., MUNICIPAL CODE, § 31-13; see also Johnson v. City of Dallas,
61 F.3d 442, 445 (5th Cir. 1995) (overruling the District Court’s preliminary
injunction enjoining enforcement of the ordinance for lack of standing).
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the trial court ruled that being convicted of the offense constituted
cruel and unusual punishment,84 the decision was reversed on appeal
one year later.85 The rationale behind upholding the law was that
none of the plaintiffs had actually been convicted of the offense, and
therefore lacked the requisite standing to contest the law as being a
cruel and unusual punishment.86
In 2004, despite the failure of the constitutional challenge, roughly
36% of Dallas’ homeless population did not have access to some form
of shelter.87 This meant that Dallas’ homeless population could
continue to be arrested for sleeping in public provided they were not
prosecuted and convicted for the offense even though there was
insufficient shelter space to accommodate them.88 Despite having
substantially reduced the number of chronic homeless people in the
city, a 2015 Point in Time (PIT) count estimated that 363 of the
roughly 3141 homeless people were unsheltered, and that the number
of chronically homeless people had increased from the previous
year.89
Some state penal codes also have provisions which penalize
sleeping in public. For instance, a California Penal Code provision
creates the misdemeanor offense of disorderly conduct for “lodg[ing]
in any building, structure, vehicle, or place, whether public or private,
without the permission of the owner or person entitled to the

84.
85.
86.
87.

See Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 359 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
See Johnson, 61 F.3d at 445.
Id. at 444–45.
See AUSTIN/TRAVIS CTY. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. DEP’T, A COMPARISON OF

HOMELESS SERVICES AMONG FIVE CITIES UTILIZING EXISTING DATA: AUSTIN,
DALLAS,
HOUSTON,
SAN
ANTONIO,
AND
SEATTLE
6
(2005),
http://canatx.org/homeless/documents/HomelessServiceComparisonFiveCities.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CN49-VZ3M] [hereinafter COMPARISON OF HOMELESS SERVICES];
see also Justin Cook, Down and Out in San Antonio: The Constitutionality of San
Antonio’s Anti-Homeless Ordinances, 8 SCHOLAR 221, 223 (2006) (citing
COMPARISON OF HOMELESS SERVICES). All five cities studied had insufficient shelter
space to accommodate the homeless. Cook, supra, at 223.
88. See Eric Nicholson, Dallas Police Are Now Rounding Up Homeless People
for “Sleeping in Public” Downtown, DALLAS OBSERVER (Feb. 5, 2014),
http://www.dallasobserver.com/news/dallas-police-are-now-rounding-up-homelesspeople-for-sleeping-in-public-downtown-7121564 [https://perma.cc/Q3RG-JLQG].
89. METRO DALLAS HOUS. ALL., 2015 POINT-IN-TIME HOMELESS COUNT AND
SURVEY REPORT 6 (2015), http://www.mdhadallas.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/
2015-PIT-Report-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/947D-FQMH]; see also Eric
Nicholson, Dallas’ Neverending Crackdown on Sleeping While Homeless, DALLAS
OBSERVER (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.dallasobserver.com/news/dallas-neverendingcrackdown-on-sleeping-while-homeless-7971590 [https://perma.cc/372J-XN4].
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possession or in control of it.”90 Yet according to 2012 statistics, only
35% of homeless persons in the state have shelter on a particular
night.91 If the homeless sleep on public property, they can be ticketed
or arrested for disorderly conduct.92 Yet if they sleep on another
person’s private property without their permission, they can be
ticketed for trespassing.93 Even homeless persons themselves may be
unaware of a public place where they can sleep without being
penalized. In a 2013 survey, only a quarter of the homeless persons
surveyed stated they knew of a public place where they could legally
and safely sleep.94

2.

Anti-Public Camping Laws

Other laws do not specifically ban sleeping in public, but forbid
camping or erecting temporary shelters in public despite a lack of
available shelter space.95 Without these temporary shelters, homeless
people are unable to sleep outside without exposing themselves to
low temperatures, rain, wind, or snow.96 In 2005, the city of San
Antonio approved a city ordinance which banned camping in any
public place, unless the person had permission or paid for a daily
permit.97 Around that time, there were roughly only enough
emergency shelter spaces for half of the homeless population.98

90. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e) (West 2013); see also BERKELEY LAW POLICY
ADVOCACY CLINIC, CALIFORNIA’S NEW VAGRANCY LAWS: THE GROWING
ENACTMENT AND ENFORCEMENT OF ANTI-HOMELESS LAWS IN THE GOLDEN STATE, 7
(2015) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA’S NEW VAGRANCY LAWS].
91. See Farida Ali, Limiting the Poor’s Right to Public Space: Criminalizing
Homelessness in California, 21 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 197, 201 (2014)
(citing U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. OFF. OF COMM. PLAN. AND DEV., THE
2012 POINT-IN-TIME ESTIMATES OF HOMELESSNESS: VOLUME I OF THE 2012 ANNUAL
HOMELESS ASSESSMENT REPORT 3 (2012)).
92. PENAL CODE § 647(e).
93. See Juliette Smith, Arresting the Homeless for Sleeping in Public: A Paradigm
for Expanding the Robinson Doctrine, 29 COLUM. J. LEGAL & SOC. PROBS. 293, 321
n.168 (1996).
94. See NO SAFE PLACE, supra note 55, at 16.
95. See id. at 18–19.
96. See Victoria (City) v. Adams, [2009] 100 B.C.L.R. 4th 28, para. 28 (Can. B.C.).
97. Cook, supra note 87, at 223 (citing SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF
ORDINANCES, §§ 21–28 (2005)). Moreover, the cost of an overnight permit for
camping in a public area is $20 and requires a reservation. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE
OF ORDINANCES, §§ 22–25 (2016).
98. Cook, supra note 87, at 230 (noting there were roughly 3300 homeless persons
yet only approximately 1617 shelter beds in the year 2004); see also COMPARISON OF
HOMELESS SERVICES, supra note 87.
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Two similar situations occurred in the province of British
Columbia, Canada. The first occurred in the city of Victoria, where
there were over 1000 homeless persons but only 141 regular shelter
spaces, and 326 shelter spaces in cases of extreme weather.99 At the
time, bylaws prohibited setting up tents or shelters in public parks or
on streets.100 Experts testified at trial that if people tried to sleep
without shelter, they exposed themselves to the elements and
associated risks of developing skin infections, frostbite, hypothermia,
and certain communicable diseases.101 According to the monthly
weather averages for the city, the average low temperature was below
ten degrees Celsius (fifty-one degrees Fahrenheit) for eight months of
the year.102 When the City obtained an injunction to enforce the
bylaws which would result in the dismantling of the camp, a group of
homeless persons brought a constitutional challenge to the bylaws so
as to enjoin their enforcement.103 Notably, they contended that
obeying the bylaws exposed them to the risk of injury and death by
preventing them from erecting shelter which would otherwise protect
them from the elements.104 They argued that the ordinances deprived
them of their right to life, liberty, and security of the person
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Canadian Charter and in a manner
that was not in accordance with principles of fundamental justice.105
In Canadian law, establishing a violation of a Section 7
constitutional right entails a two-step analysis, where the court must
first conclude that a person’s constitutional right to either life, liberty,

99. See Adams, 100 B.C.L.R. 4th 28, at para. 28.
100. See id. at paras. 22–23 (citing City of Victoria, B.C., Parks Regulation Bylaw
No. 07-059 §§ 14(1)(d), 16(1) (Can.) (prohibiting “taking up a temporary abode overnight” in parks and erecting tents in public parks without the council’s permission));
City of Victoria, B.C., Streets and Traffic Bylaw, No. 92-84 §§ 73, 74 (Can.) (creating
an offense for erecting temporary shelters on streets); see also Sarah Buhler,
Cardboard Boxes and Invisible Fences: The Homeless and Public Space in City of
Victoria v. Adams, 27 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 209, 211–13 (2009).
101. See Victoria (City) v. Adams, [2008] B.C.S.C. 1363, paras. 67–68 (Can.).
102. See Victoria, B.C. Weather and Climate, TOURISM VICTORIA (2012),
http://www.tourismvictoria.com/plan/climate/ [https://perma.cc/M2JM-H6VK].
103. See Adams, [2008] B.C.S.C. 1363, para. 2.
104. See id. at para. 108.
105. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11, § 7 (U.K.), provides:
“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to
be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”
See also Sarah E. Hamill, Private Property Rights and Public Responsibility: Leaving
Room for the Homeless, 30 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 91, 108–09 (2011).
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or security of the person was violated.106 If this is satisfied, the court
must then examine whether the deprivation breached a principle of
fundamental justice.107 Principles of fundamental justice “are about
the basic values underpinning [Canada’s] constitutional order”108 and
are “found in the basic tenets . . . of [the country’s] legal system,”109
and include the principles that laws cannot be arbitrary,110
overbroad,111 or vague,112 amongst others.
The Court concluded that the provisions were a form of state
action that impaired a homeless person’s ability to protect themselves
from the elements and from different forms of harm, and therefore
resulted in a deprivation of their right to life, liberty, and security of
the person.113 Moreover, they concluded that the deprivation
breached the principle of fundamental justice and that parts of the
law were overbroad.114 In their words:
The prohibition on shelter contained in the Bylaws is overbroad
because it is in effect at all times, in all public places in the City.
There are a number of less restrictive alternatives that would further
the City’s concerns regarding the preservation of urban parks. The
City could require the overhead protection to be taken down every
morning, as well as prohibit sleeping in sensitive park regions.115

As a result, the portions of the law which prevented the homeless
from erecting overnight temporary shelters in parks were rendered
inoperative due to their unconstitutionality.116
The second situation occurred in the city of Abbotsford, British
Columbia. In Abbotsford v. Shantz, a series of bylaws prohibited
people from erecting temporary shelters in public areas.117 At the

106. See Reference re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, paras. 105–06
(Can.).
107. Id. at para. 105.
108. Canada (Att’y General) v. Bedford, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101, para. 96 (Can.).
109. See Reference re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 487 (Can.).
110. See R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (Can.).
111. See Bedford, 3 S.C.R. 1101, at paras. 112–13 (Can.).
112. See R. v. Levkovic, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 204 (Can.).
113. Victoria (City) v. Adams, [2009]100 B.C.L.R. 4th 28, paras. 82–89 (Can. B.C.).
114. Id. at paras. 114–16, 166.
115. Id. at para. 116.
116. See id. at para. 166 (finding the law unconstitutional pursuant to Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11, § 7 (U.K)).
117. See Abbotsford (City) v. Shantz, [2015] B.C.S.C. 1909, para. 124 (Can. B.C.);
Abbotsford, B.C., Good Neighbor Bylaw, Bylaw No. 1256-2003 (Can.); Abbotsford,
B.C., Consolidated Parks Bylaw, Consolidated Parks Bylaw, 1996, Bylaw No. 160-95
(Can.).
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time the ordinances were enforced, there were roughly 151 homeless
people, but only roughly 25-30 emergency shelter beds at the local
Salvation Army, as well as roughly 100 other beds available at
abstinence-based addiction treatment centers.118 The Salvation Army
was frequently over capacity.119 Individuals were often turned away,
could not stay for more than thirty consecutive days, could only enter
and stay if they were sober, and were banned for minor rule
violations.120 This presented a particular problem for many of the
city’s homeless, who suffered from drug or alcohol addictions.121
Other types of shelter had monthly rents costing over $375 per month
and which the homeless could not afford.122 This led the trial judge to
reject the notion that the homeless people of the city were choosing
to live in public and conclude:
In addition, to assert that homelessness is a choice ignores realities
such as poverty, low income, lack of work opportunities, the decline
in public assistance, the structure and administration of government
support, the lack of affordable housing, addiction disorders, and
mental illness. I accept that drug and alcohol addictions are health
issues as much as physical and other mental illnesses. Nearly all of
the formerly homeless witnesses called by DWS gave evidence
relating to some combination of financial desperation, drug
addiction, mental illness, physical disability, institutional trauma and
distrust, physical or emotional abuse and family breakdown which
led, at least in part, the witness becoming homeless.
Given the personal circumstances of the City’s homeless, the shelter
spaces that are presently available to others in the City are
impractical for many of the City’s homeless. They simply cannot
abide by the rules required in many of the facilities that I have
discussed above, and lack the means to pay the required rents at
others. While some of those who are amongst the City’s homeless
have declined available shelter, I am satisfied that at the present
time there is insufficient accessible shelter space in the City to house
all of the City’s homeless persons.123

Similar to the Adams case, the court concluded that the bylaws
deprived the homeless of their constitutional right to life, liberty, and
security of the person in a way that breached the principle of

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Shantz, [2015] B.C.S.C. 1909, at paras. 34, 52, 61–62.
Id. at paras. 52–53.
Id. at para. 54.
Id. at para. 74.
Id. at paras. 57–60.
Id. at paras. 81–82.
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fundamental justice that laws cannot be overbroad.124 As a result, the
court declared portions of the laws which prevented the homeless
from lawfully establishing overnight shelter to be unconstitutional,
rendering them inoperative.125 Ultimately, the decision resulted in
the homeless being allowed to erect temporary shelters between 7 PM
and 9 AM.126
When laws impose comprehensive bans on conduct, such as public
sleeping even though no alternatives are available, there is drastic
disparity in the ability to obey the law on a consistent basis between
those who have access to housing and those who do not. In these
cases, adherence to the law by the homeless on a consistent basis
becomes the exception rather than the rule, whereas adherence to the
law would be the rule for those with access to housing. Moreover, the
possibility to adhere to the law is largely a matter of chance. One
could conclude that, although it is not outright impossible for every
homeless person to obey a law which comprehensively bans sleeping
in public, the fact that only a percentage of them could obey it on a
consistent basis renders adherence to it particularly difficult,
arbitrary, and random.
B.

City-Wide Anti-Begging Laws and Lack of Sufficient Income

1.

Homelessness and Panhandling

Laws which penalize the homeless often prohibit begging or
panhandling.127 As I argue, these laws can be impossible to respect
because in some cases, there may be no other reasonable means for
the homeless to obtain enough money to survive without resorting to
begging.128 This lack of reasonable alternative means that in some

124. Id. at para. 204 (concluding that the provisions violated the principle of
fundamental justice that laws cannot produce grossly disproportional effects in
pursuing the objective in question, explaining “[g]ross disproportionality describes
state actions or legislative responses to a problem that are so extreme as to be
disproportionate to any legitimate government interest. This principle is infringed if
the impact of the restriction on the individual’s life, liberty or security of the person is
grossly disproportionate to the object of the measure.”) (citing Can. (Att’y General)
v. PHS Comm. Servs. Soc’y, [2011] S.C.R. 44, para. 133 (Can.)).
125. Id. at paras. 279–80.
126. Id.
127. See NO SAFE PLACE, supra note 55, at 20–21; Damian Collins & Nicholas
Blomley, Private Needs and Public Space: Politics, Poverty, and Anti-Panhandling
By-Laws in Canadian Cities, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE PUBLIC—PRIVATE
DIVIDE 40–41 (Law Comm’n of Can. ed., 2003).
128. See, e.g., the testimony presented by the defendant in In re Eichom, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 535, 540 (Ct. App. 1998) (homeless veteran successfully raised the necessity
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contexts, they will either beg and break the law, or, endanger their
wellbeing by having insufficient money for food, clothing, emergency
shelter, transportation, or other necessities.129
Not all persons who panhandle are homeless.130 There are
different estimates regarding the percentage of homeless people who
resort to begging to earn their money and little data on the subject is
available following the 2008 economic crash. Some survey studies
undertaken in the late 1980s in different American cities estimated
the number of homeless people resorting to begging to range from
anywhere between the low single-digits to numbers as high as thirtyfour percent in some cities.131
More recently, Stephen Gaetz and Bill O’Grady conducted a
survey-type study published in 2002, which examined how homeless
people under the age of twenty-four earned money in the city of
Toronto, Canada.132 Roughly twelve percent of those surveyed
identified panhandling as their primary income-generating activity.133
In a 2002 survey-study conducted by Rohit Bose and Stephen Hwang
in Toronto, and with the admittedly small sample size of fifty-four
panhandlers, approximately sixty-five percent reported being
homeless.134
The researchers suggested that the majority of
defense to an anti-camping ordinance, testifying that after having lost his job, he
usually only had access to a motel when he had enough money).
129. See Antonia K. Fasanelli, Note, In Re: Eichorn: The Long Awaited

Implementation of the Necessity Defence in a Case of the Criminalization of
Homelessness, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 330, n.36 (2001) (citing NAT’L LAW CTR. ON

HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, DUE CREDIT 2 (1993)) (noting that the homeless often
have to panhandle to make enough money in order to survive).
130. See Stephen Moss, Who Hails the Get-Up-and-Go Spirit of the Beggar on 50k
a Year?, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2013/jun/06/beggar-50k-year-london [https://perma.cc/Q3CB-8XWQ] (describing a
London, England area beggar who made roughly 50,000 GBP per year begging,
spent his money gambling or in amusement arcades, lived in a council flat, and was
not homeless); Louisa R. Stark, From Lemons to Lemonade: An Ethnographic
Sketch of Late Twentieth Century Panhandling, in HOMELESSNESS: NEW ENGLAND
AND BEYOND 341–43 (Padraig O’Malley ed., 1992); Derek Thompson, Should You
Give Money to Homeless People, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 22, 2011),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/03/should-you-give-money-tohomeless-people/72820 [https://perma.cc/5YDR-42FZ]..
131. See Stark, supra note 130, at 342–43 (summarizing studies).
132. Stephen Gaetz & Bill O’Grady, Making Money: Exploring the Economy of
Young Homeless Workers, 16 WORK, EMP., & SOC’Y 433 (2002).
133. Id. at 441.
134. Rohit Bose & Stephen Hwang, Income and Spending Patterns Among
Panhandlers, 167 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 477, 477 (2002). See also Bill O’Grady,
Stephen Gaetz & Kristy Buccieri, Tickets . . . and More Tickets: A Case Study of the
Enforcement of the Ontario Safe Streets Act, 39 CAN. PUB. POL’Y 541, 546 (2013)
(citing Panhandling Charges Soar in 2007: Toronto Police, CBC NEWS (Aug. 17,
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panhandlers they came in contact with “are homeless and living in
extreme poverty” and made roughly $300 a month from panhandling,
for a total average monthly income of roughly $640 in the year
2001.135 The authors suggested that for those who panhandled and
had access to some form of shelter—such as a rented room or
subsidized housing—loss of panhandling income risked sending them
back on the streets, as it would make rent payments infeasible.136
One of the most recent surveys regarding the number of beggars who
reported being homeless was conducted by the Union Square
Business Improvement District in San Francisco.137 In a survey of 120
panhandlers, roughly eighty-two percent reported being homeless.138
Therefore, in certain areas, an important number of panhandlers may,
in fact, be homeless.

2.

Comprehensive Bans on Panhandling

According to the NLCHP, approximately one quarter of cities that
they tracked had a city-wide ban on begging in public.139 But this
statistic can be misleading, because many of the cities classified as
prohibiting panhandling city-wide only impose city-wide bans against
aggressive forms of begging. In some of these cities, peaceful forms
of panhandling are actually permitted in different parts of the city.
For example, Santa Barbara is listed as a city which imposes a citywide ban on panhandling.140 Yet peaceful panhandling is allowed
within the city, including in parks and in areas of the city not
otherwise restricted. Only aggressive forms of panhandling and
soliciting a captive audience (e.g., where one solicits a person within a

2007),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/story/2007/08/17/panhandlerspolice.html [https://perma.cc/K3VS-V6A3] (noting that police estimated that roughly
ninety percent of tickets issued under the Safe Streets Act for prohibited forms of
panhandling were given to persons with no fixed address).
135. Bose & Hwang, supra note 134, at 478.
136. See id. at 478–79.
137. See Union Square Business Improvement District, Survey of Panhandlers In
GLS
RESEARCH
(March
2013),
The
Union
Square
Area,
http://californiadowntown.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/SocialEquity_Flood.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W9PL-DTFM] [hereinafter Survey of Panhandlers]; see also
Heather Knight, The City’s Panhandlers Tell Their Own Stories, S.F. CHRON. (Oct.
27, 2013), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/The-city-s-panhandlers-tell-theirown-stories-4929388.php [https://perma.cc/4QML-VVPV].
138. Survey of Panhandlers, supra note 137, at 6.
139. NO SAFE PLACE, supra note 55, at 9.
140. Id. at Appendix A.
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certain distance of an ATM, bus stop, etc.) is forbidden city-wide.141
The same is true of an ordinance in Gainesville, Florida, which
imposes a city-wide ban on panhandling even though people are able
to peacefully beg on city corners, sidewalks, and in parks.142
Some cities, however, do impose comprehensive bans on begging in
public. Chula Vista in California makes it an offense:
[F]or any person at any place within the City to beg or solicit alms or
any other thing or money for his support or for the support of
anyone else, or for any other purpose, or to make a business of
begging or soliciting alms, money, or thing of value, either by word
or act or combination thereof, as hereinafter defined.143

A law in Oakland, California, states that: “No person shall solicit
contributions for himself or herself in or upon any public street or
public place in the city.”144 In the past, other American cities have
also imposed similar bans.145 In Canada, comprehensive bans on
begging have also existed.146 For instance, in the city of Ottawa, a
municipal bylaw enacted in 1991 banned begging in any public place,
punishable by a fine of up to $5000.147 The law was ultimately
repealed in the year 2000.148

141. SANTA BARBARA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 9.50.020(C) (2015) (defining abusive
panhandling to involve begging in a way that threatens persons, blocks their path, or
involves touching or following them). SANTA BARBARA, CAL., MUN. CODE §
9.50.030(B) (2015) (prohibiting active panhandling in restricted locations, such as
within a certain distance of bus stops, ATMs, and on buses).
142. GAINESVILLE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 19-79, 19-81(c)(1)-(2), 19-82(h)
(2015); NO SAFE PLACE, supra note 55, at Appendix A.
VISTA,
CAL.,
MUNICIPAL
CODE
§
9.21.010
(2016),
143. CHULA
http://www.codepublishing.com/CA/chulavista/ [https://perma.cc/YVD6-JT89]; see
also CALIFORNIA’S NEW VAGRANCY LAWS, supra note 90, at 39 (citing the municipal
code).
144. OAKLAND, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 5.18.030 (2016); NO SAFE PLACE, supra
note 55, at Appendix A.
145. See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1576 n.33 (S.D. Fla. 1992)
(citing MIAMI, FLA., CODE § 37-17 (1990)) (including within the offense of “disorderly
conduct” those who were found begging); see also ST. AUGUSTINE, FLA., CODE § 188(b)(4) (stating that it shall be unlawful for any person within the city to
“[p]anhandle, solicit or beg on any sidewalk, highway, street, roadway, right-of-way,
parking lot, park, or other public or semi-public area or in any building lobby,
entranceway, plaza or common area in the prohibited public area.” (2010)).
146. See CITY OF OTTAWA, ON, BY-LAW NO. 117-91, A BY-LAW OF THE
CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF OTTAWA RESPECTING PUBLIC NUISANCES (Canada)
(May 15, 1991); see also Dina Graser, Panhandling for Change in Canadian Law, 15
J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 45, 48 (2000).
147. Graser, supra note 146, at 74.
148. Id. at 53.
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Panhandling, Lack of Reasonable Alternatives, and Lack of
Opportunity

The problem with comprehensive bans on begging is that for a
variety of reasons, including criminal convictions, some homeless
people are unable to access unemployment or welfare benefits, which
may render securing shelter and satisfying other basic needs
impossible without panhandling.149 Even if they do have access to
welfare benefits, it may fall short of what is minimally required to
access reasonable long-term housing options, let alone food and
clothing.150 Begging may, therefore, be necessary to fill the gap
between social assistance and the need for shelter and food.151 For
instance, in Skid Row, Los Angeles, the cheapest available long term
housing option was single-room-occupancy housing (SRO).152 In
1999, the monthly rent for an SRO was approximately $379 per
month, even though monthly welfare checks amounted to only
$221.153 Moreover, the waiting time to access public housing was
between three and ten years long.154
There may also be a variety of internal factors inherent to homeless
individuals which make them unable to access the formal economy.155
The homeless may lack the education or skills to be formally

149. STEPHEN GAETZ & BILL O’GRADY, THE JOHN HOWARD SOCIETY OF
ONTARIO, THE MISSING LINK: DISCHARGE PLANNING, INCARCERATION, AND
HOMELESSNESS 40–41 (2006); PATRICIA ALLARD, LIFE SENTENCES: DENYING
WELFARE BENEFITS TO WOMEN CONVICTED OF DRUG OFFENSES 1–9 (2002),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/women_lifesentences.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R93S-XNLT].
150. Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
643, 651 (2009); Stephan Baron, Street Youth Labour Market Experiences and
Crime, 38 CAN. REV. SOC’Y & ANTHROPOLOGY 189, 190, 196 (2001).
151. See Jackie Esmonde, Criminalizing Poverty: The Criminal Law Power and the
Safe Streets Act, 17 J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 63, 69 (2002). One study of homeless Toronto
youth noted that, due to a constant lack of availability of food, panhandling or
squeegeeing was often necessary to generate enough income for meals. However,
even then, the amount of income generated by these informal economic activities was
never enough to consistently meet any of the youths’ daily food needs. See Naomi
Dachner & Valerie Tarasuk, Homeless “Squeegee Kids”: Food Insecurity and Daily
Survival, 54 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1039, 1044–46 (2002).
152. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 2006)
(explaining SRO’s are “multi-unit housing for very low income persons typically
consisting of a single room with shared bathroom”).
153. Id. at 1122.
154. Id.
155. See Stephen Gaetz, Safe Streets for Whom? Homeless Youth, Social
Exclusion, and Criminal Victimization, 46 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 423,
430 (2004) (discussing barriers to employment of homeless youth).
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employable,156 may possess a criminal record severely reducing their
chances of employment,157 may be unhygienic or otherwise
unpresentable,158 may have a mental or physical disability making it
difficult to be employed,159 may be addicted to alcohol or to drugs,160
or may have a combination of these different factors which would
preclude formal employment.161 Because “housing and successful
employment are directly related,” even the homeless seeking stable
formal employment can be at a net disadvantage.162 Together, these
factors have led some to the conclusion that “for the uneducated and
unskilled, begging may be the only viable alternative to charity and
welfare in depressed labor markets.”163
Several combined factors may also suggest that, due to the lack of
financial resources available to homeless persons, including
insufficient income from social security, the homeless panhandle
because it is their only available means to make money.164 Although
there are media reports of some individuals making exorbitant

156. See Kristin M. Ferguson et al., Employment Status and Income Generation
Among Homeless Young Adults: Results From a Five-City, Mixed-Methods Study,

44 YOUTH & SOC’Y 385, 387 (2012) (discussing how low education levels and limited
work histories can reduce employability of young homeless persons).
157. See Helen Lam & Mark Harcourt, The Use of Criminal Record in
Employment Decisions: The Rights of Ex-Offenders, Employers and the Public, 47 J.
BUS. ETHICS 237, 241–42 (2003) (explaining how a criminal record “reduce[s] the
prospect of getting a job”). Furthermore, even having been accused of certain crimes
but subsequently acquitted can drastically reduce a person’s prospect of employment.
See Jessica S. Henry & James B. Jacobs, Ban the Box to Promote Ex-Offender
Employment, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 755, 756 (2007).
158. Sylvestre & Bellot, supra note 10, at 172 (citing Christine Campbell & Paul
Eid, LA JUDICIARISATION DES PERSONNES ITINÉRANTES A MONTRÉAL: UN PROFILAGE
SOCIAL 89 (CDPDJ 2009), http://www.cdpdj.qc.ca/publications/itinerance_avis.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H8FR-PTWG]).
159. Survey of Panhandlers, supra note 137, at 7 (finding that in a survey of 120
beggars near Union Square, San Francisco, the large majority of whom were
homeless, 56% reported being physically disabled, 49% reported chronic depression,
and 43% reported suffering from a chronic physical illness).
160. See NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND
HOMELESSNESS (2009), http://www.nationalhomeless.org/factsheets/addiction.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GB39-78ED] (estimating that, in 2003, roughly 38% of homeless
persons were dependent on alcohol and roughly 26% abused drugs).
161. See Patricia K. Smith, The Economics of Anti-Begging Regulations, 64 AM. J.
ECON. & SOC. 549, 555, 559–60 (2005).
162. Michael L. Shier, Marion E. Jones & John R. Graham, Employment
Difficulties Experienced by Employed Homeless People, 16 J. POVERTY 27, 29
(2012).
163. Smith, supra note 161, at 555.
164. See Esmonde, supra note 151, at 66–69; see also Bose & Hwang, supra note
134, at 477 (identifying characteristics of panhandlers in a 2001 Toronto study).
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amounts of money from begging,165 some studies have shown that
those who beg tend to earn little income.166 Other research shows
that those who panhandle tend to spend most of their money quickly,
generally to purchase food.167 They are often humiliated and feel that
constantly asking others for money is degrading.168 Some studies
suggest that most people do not enjoy panhandling.169 When all of
these different factors are considered together, it begs the question of
why people would panhandle—unless it is one of their only ways of
making money.
My concern is that comprehensively banning begging when there is
no reasonable alternative demeans the dignity of the homeless by
removing their opportunity to earn income and acquire property like
other people. For instance, Nussbaum has recognized that the ability
to own property and have “property rights on an equal basis with
others” is an essential capability to have a minimal standard of
living.170 As some property law theorists have noted, property can
perhaps be construed as constituting an integral aspect of our
personhood by allowing us to have some control over our future
through the control of our property.171 In order to flourish on a
comparable level to other human beings, it is not sufficient that
people are abstractly capable of owning or acquiring property, but
rather that they have “the material resources required to nurture
those capabilities.”172

165. See Moss, supra note 130 (describing a London, England area beggar who
made roughly 50,000 GBP per year begging, spent his money gambling or in
amusement arcades, lived in a council flat, and was not homeless); Ron Dicker,

Panhandler Shane Warren Speegle Says He Made $60,000 A Year Begging On
Street, HUFFINGTON POST (July 23, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/

23/shane-warren-speegle-says_n_1694577.html [https://perma.cc/N3X5-S8LF].
166. For a summary of studies on this matter, see Smith, supra note 161, at 555–58,
and Bose & Hwang, supra note 134, at 478 (reporting that the average monthly
income from panhandling in the city of Toronto was $300).
167. See Barrett A. Lee & Chad R. Farrell, Buddy Can You Spare a Dime?
Homelessness, Panhandling, and the Public, 38 URB. AFF. REV. 299, 304 (2003); Bose
& Hwang, supra note 134, at 478.
168. See Bose & Hwang, supra note 134, at 478; Gaetz & O’Grady, supra note 132,
at 441.
169. See Bose & Hwang, supra note 134, at 478; Stephen E. Lankenau, Stronger
than Dirt: Public Humiliation and Status Enhancement Among Panhandlers, 28 J.
CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 288, 298 (1999); Smith, supra note 161, at 558.
170. NUSSBAUM, supra note 34, at 34.
171. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 968
(1982).
172. Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property
Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 768 (2009).
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In other words, rather than merely construing human dignity as a
notion limited to recognizing the inherent worth of individuals,
treating individuals with equal concern and respect also entails
allowing them to have the opportunity to earn income as a means of
acquiring the material resources which protect their “high and equal
status” as members of the human community.173 Of course, the act of
begging can itself be considered undignified.174 But if this is the only
opportunity some homeless individuals have to acquire minimal
necessary resources to live a life that they construe to be a meaningful
existence, completely removing this opportunity without providing
another demeans their dignity and ability to flourish even further.175
III. COMBINED APPLICATION OF DIFFERENT LAWS
Thus far, I have examined the impact of comprehensive bans
against certain public conduct engaged in by the homeless as part of
their existence and why these bans are objectionable. In this Part, I
build on the work of Jeremy Waldron and argue that, in some cases,
the cumulative effect of different individual prohibitions, property
law rules, the configuration of public spaces, and certain pragmatic
realties make it extremely difficult—if not impossible in some cases—
for the homeless to obey the law even though people with access to
housing would have no comparable difficulty.176
There are two particular contexts. First, as Waldron has argued,
the law sometimes imposes a series of individual restrictions that, on
their own, may individually be possible to obey.177 However, the
cumulative effect of these individual quality of life offenses and
property law rules amount to a de facto comprehensive prohibition
against the behavior in question by removing the alternatives.178 To
illustrate this concept, I examine the combined consequences of
different laws that can amount to something very near to a
comprehensive ban on loitering.
The second context involves the use of police discretion to enforce
quality of life offenses, which can regulate nearly every aspect of a

173. Id.; see also WALDRON, supra note 24, at 14.
174. See Waldron, supra note 10, at 320 (noting how certain acts like publicly
urinating or sleeping are not in themselves necessarily dignified, but that “there is
certainly something deeply and inherently undignified about being prevented from
doing so”).
175. See Waldron, supra note 10, at 320.
176. See id. at 316.
177. See id. at 316.
178. See id. at 315–16.
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homeless person’s life and behavior. As a result, no matter how
precise an individual law prohibiting particular conduct is, police
officers sometimes selectively enforce them in such a way that it can
make breaking the law unavoidable for the homeless.179
A. The Cumulative Effect of Different Individual Prohibitions

1.

Anti-Loitering Laws, Anti-Sitting Laws, and the Lack of
Available Alternative Spaces

In some cases, even where the law does not completely prohibit
certain behavior, the combined effect of different laws amounts to a
near comprehensive ban on the conduct in question, which can be
extremely difficult to obey.180 Loitering laws aim to limit the
continued presence of persons in certain public spaces.181 Although
American and Canadian courts have struck down certain loitering
laws for vagueness and overbreadth concerns,182 cities often
responded by enacting more narrowly tailored statutes which apply to

179. See generally Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in
Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551,
615–16 (1997); Marie-Ève Sylvestre, Disorder and Public Spaces in Montreal:
Repression (and Resistance) Through Law, Politics, and Police Discretion, 31 URB.
GEOGRAPHY 803, 804 (2010) [hereinafter Repression (and Resistance)].
180. Waldron, supra note 10, at 316.
181. Eileen Divringi, Public Safety or Social Exclusion? Constitutional Challenges
to the Enforcement of Loitering Offenses, 8 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 1, 1 (2014).
182. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (striking down a California

law prohibiting loitering in certain places and obliging loitering persons to give
credible and reliable identification when demanded by a police officer for vagueness
concerns related to the notion of what constituted “credible and reliable
identification” and, thus, violated due process rights); Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (striking down a city ordinance prohibiting “persons
wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or
object, [and] habitual loafers” for vagueness concerns because the ordinance failed to
give fair notice of the law to persons of reasonable intelligence); Lazarus v. Faircloth,
301 F. Supp. 266, 271 (S.D. Fla. 1969), vacated, 401 U.S. 987 (1971) (striking down a
Florida Statute penalizing “wandering or strolling around without a lawful purpose or
object” as well as persons who are “without reasonably continuous employment or
regular income and who have not sufficient property to sustain them, and misspend
what they earn without providing for themselves or the support of their families,” for
vagueness and over breadth concerns); Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897 (D.
Colo. 1969) (striking down a Colorado statute prohibiting loitering for vagueness,
equal protection, and due process concerns); State v. Father Richard, 836 P.2d 622
(Nev. 1992) (striking down a Nevada statute and Las Vegas Municipal Code offense
which prohibited loitering on private property for vagueness concerns); R. v.
Heywood, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 (Can.) (striking down a statute prohibiting persons
convicted of certain offenses from loitering in different areas for overbreadth
concerns).
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specific places or are enforceable between certain times.183 These
types of loitering offenses continue to be widely enforced in North
America.184 For instance, in the United States, thirty-three percent of
cities studied by the NHCLP imposed city-wide bans on loitering,
whereas sixty-five percent banned loitering in specific places.185
Moreover, such ordinances are often enforced in conjunction with
trespass offenses.186 Even without a comprehensive ban against
loitering, a combination of narrowly-tailored individual laws which
may be possible to obey individually can collectively amount to a
near-complete prohibition against loitering.187
For instance, in addition to laws that specifically ban loitering,
other statutes prohibit conduct amounting to loitering, such as “sitting
or lying down in public,” especially on sidewalks.188 An actively
enforced San Francisco ordinance conceived in 2011, prohibited
sitting or lying on sidewalks between 7 AM and 11 PM, with certain
narrow exceptions, including medical emergencies.189 Even though
obeying this law may not be impossible and the ban is not
comprehensive in the sense that homeless people can presumably sit
in other places, it is important to consider how difficult it would be for
the homeless to obey the law in light of the lack of alternatives.
Notably, as the New York Times reported, the city removed many
public benches around the same time.190 The number of homeless

183. See Donald Saelinger, Nowhere to Go: The Impacts of City Ordinances
Criminalizing Homelessness, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 545, 551 (2006).
184. See Smith, supra note 93, at 304. In Canada few, if any, narrowly-tailored

loitering ordinances have been constitutionally challenged since the Supreme Court
of Canada struck down the former vagrancy provision of the Criminal Code in R. v.
Heywood, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 for overbreadth. As will be discussed further on, many
narrowly drafted loitering laws continue to exist; for example, those governing
loitering in subway stations.
185. NO SAFE PLACE, supra note 55, at 8.
186. Id. at 22.
187. See Waldron, supra note 10, at 315–16.
188. See NO SAFE PLACE, supra note 55, at 8 (finding that of the cities surveyed by
the NLCHP, more than half prohibited sitting or lying on sidewalks).
189. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., POLICE CODE, § 168. See Heather Knight, Sit/Lie Law
Primarily Enforced in Haight, S.F. GATE (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.sfgate.com/
news/article/Sit-lie-law-primarily-enforced-in-Haight-3763521.php [https://perma.cc/
4YQ7-UF82]. According to access to information requests, “422 formal warnings
and 333 citations [were issued] in the first year.” Id. Moreover, “[e]ighteen times,
repeat offenders have been arrested and booked into county jail.” Id. Full text of the
ordinance available online at: http://sfgov2.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/elections/candidates/
Nov2010_CivilSidewalks.pdf [https://perma.cc/YKN7-779S].
190. Zusha Elinson, A Renewed Public Push for Somewhere to Sit Outdoors, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2012), https://nyti.ms/2h7S1j3.

2016]

HOMELESSNESS

769

shelters and drop-in centers was also reduced,191 and those that stayed
open were closed for significant periods throughout the day, forcing
those who used the services to leave.192 Entrance to coffee shops,
restaurants, or other private spaces, are all subject to permission by
the owner of the establishment, under penalty of being issued a
trespassing ticket.193 Even the homeless who stayed in public parks
risked being punished. If they were so tired they fell asleep between
the hours of 8 PM and 8 AM, they could be ticketed.194
Physical disabilities can also play a role in making it more difficult
for the homeless to obey loitering laws. They are often forced to
carry all of their heavy belongings with them and as a result, they

191. Heather Knight, A Decade of Homelessness: Thousands in S.F. Remain in
Crisis, S.F. CHRON. (June 27, 2014), http://www.sfchronicle.com/archive/item/A-

decade-of-homelessness-Thousands-in-S-F-30431.php [https://perma.cc/L5HQ-E8AJ]
(noting that compared to a decade earlier, the number of shelter beds was reduced by
thirty percent and the number of drop-in centers was cut in half).
192. Many homeless shelters or resources centers are closed for different periods
throughout the day. See, e.g., Emergency Shelter for Single Adults in San Francisco,
HUMAN SERVS. AGENCY OF S.F.: DEP’T OF HUM. SERV. (Jan. 1, 2014),
http://www.sfhsa.org/82.htm [https://perma.cc/JPW7-7JYV].
For example, the
Resource Centre for the Homeless located at the Mission Neighborhood Health
Center is closed on Sundays, open between 7 AM and 12 PM on Saturdays, and
closes at 7 PM most weeknights. See Location: Homeless Resource Center, MISSION
NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH CTR., http://www.mnhc.org/place-locations/homelessresource-center/ [https://perma.cc/T6JA-3M35]. The Multi Service Centre (MSC), is
the “largest homeless shelter in Northern California,” offering shelter, food, and
drop-in services to a maximum of 480 persons per day. See MSC Shelter, ST.
VINCENT DE PAUL SOC’Y, S.F. (2016), http://svdp-sf.org/what-we-do/msc-shelter/
[https://perma.cc/A3FN-P9YB]. However, clients who sleep in the shelter must leave
by 8AM, and drop in services are only available between 9 AM and 2:30 PM. See St.
Vincent De Paul Society—Multi-Service Center South (MSC South), S.F. HOMELESS
RESOURCE, http://sfhomeless.wikia.com/wiki/St._Vincent_de_Paul_Society_-_MultiService_Center_South_(MSC_South) [https://perma.cc/YEZ9-ESRT].
193. Waldron, supra note 10, at 297, 301. See also S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE, art. 1,
§ 25 (2013), http://police.sanfranciscocode.org/1/25 [https://perma.cc/S6VA-WUC5];
see also T.J. Johnston, Thousands of Tickets Handed Out to Homeless, S.F. PUB.
PRESS (June 4, 2012), http://sfpublicpress.org/news/2012-06/thousands-of-ticketshanded-out-to-homeless [https://perma.cc/K3X9-EUKN] (describing the use of
trespassing ordinances). An access to information request revealed that trespassing
offenses were some of the most common quality of life offenses enforced, comprising
nearly nineteen percent of the total in 2011. See Dataset from Human Services
Agency, S.F. PUB. PRESS, http://sfpublicpress.org/files/documents/hsa-homelesscitations-2006-2011.xls [https://perma.cc/ENU6-KWLA].
194. S.F., CAL., PARK CODE, REGULATIONS, art. 1, § 3.13 (2013),
http://park.sanfranciscocode.org/3/3.13/ [https://perma.cc/3CE7-RJK7] (explaining
that individuals can be ticketed if they have an outstanding citation, and do not
accept social services offered by the city within thirty hours of its issuance).
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frequently sustain injuries and experience chronic pain.195 For
instance, a survey conducted by the Union Square Business
Improvement District in 2013 revealed that nearly half of the
homeless people reported suffering from a physical disability.196
Consequently, they may not be able to reach a park or some other
location where it is lawful to sit or lie down without further harm to
themselves. They may not be able to stand for long periods of time in
places where it is forbidden to sit down. The lack of alternatives may
also help explain why homeless people in San Francisco were most
frequently ticketed for unlawfully sitting, lying, and resting in public
compared with any other offense.197 The difficulty in obeying the law
is also illustrated by certain surveys demonstrating the frequency by
which the homeless in San Francisco are either ticketed or told to
move by the police.198 Notably, in a survey of 351 homeless people in
San Francisco, 88% of those who lived on the streets reported having
recently been told to move from a public space by the police.199
Furthermore, nearly 85% of those same respondents reported
receiving a citation, most frequently for committing a quality of life
offense.200 Nearly 40% of those surveyed who lived on the streets
reported receiving five or more citations.201
In other cities, different laws prohibit loitering in one way or
another in a variety of places, greatly limiting the availability of legal
alternatives. In the city of Montreal, a combination of municipal
bylaws and transportation regulations are enforced to prohibit
loitering.202 Transportation regulations prohibit loitering in subway
stations and bus shelters, including placing one’s feet on a bench,203

195. See Jessica Mackelprang, Janessa Graves & Frederick P. Rivara, Homeless in
America: Injuries Treated in U.S. Emergency Departments, 2007–2011, 21 INT. J. INJ.
CONTROL & SAFETY PROMOTION 289, 295 (2014); see also Stephen W. Hwang et al.,
Chronic Pain Among Homeless Persons: Characteristics, Treatment, and Barriers to
Management, 12 BMC FAMILY PRACTICE 73 (2011) (describing the chronic pain

experienced by the homeless).
196. Survey of Panhandlers, supra note 137, at 7.
197. See CALIFORNIA’S NEW VAGRANCY LAWS, supra note 90, at 18.
198. S.F. COAL. ON HOMELESSNESS, PUNISHING THE POOREST: HOW THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS PERPETUATES POVERTY IN SAN FRANCISCO 2
(2015).
199. Id. at 27.
200. Id. at 27, 33.
201. Id. at 27.
202. CELINE BELLOT ET AL., JUDICIARISATION ET CRIMINALISATION DES
POPULATIONS ITINÉRANTES À MONTRÉAL 28 (Montreal, October 2005).
203. Montreal, Que., By-Law R-036, 2014, §§ 1(c), 4(d) (Can.) (providing that the
regulations are applicable to subway stations and bus shelters).
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lying across a bench,204 sitting or lying on the floor,205 loitering by
behaving in a way that impedes the free flow of pedestrians,206 and
refusing to circulate when ordered.207 In Montreal, the presence of
the homeless in subways is, therefore, largely limited, and studies
have reported that special constables responsible for patrolling the
subway systems frequently expel the homeless or issue them tickets if
they loiter.208
The number of places the homeless can lawfully go, especially in
the winter, is therefore largely limited and contingent upon the
permission of others to access private property.209
The availability of places to lawfully spend one’s time is also
constrained by the fact that parks are normally closed between
midnight and 6 AM, and those loitering or sleeping in the parks
during those hours can be ticketed.210 Bylaws also prohibit the
inappropriate usage of the urban landscape in an effort to prevent
loitering, penalizing conduct such as sitting or sleeping on top of a
picnic table instead of sitting at it, or lying across the ledge of a
fountain not intended for that purpose.211 Loitering while intoxicated
in public or on the street is also a punishable offense,212 and the
criminal code penalizes any person who “loiters in a public place and
in any way obstructs persons who are in that place.”213
Even when the police do not ticket offenders for breaching the
loitering laws, they frequently expel them from public areas by

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. § 4(c).
Id. § 4(c).
Id. § 4(a).
Id. § 4(f).

Céline Bellot & Marie-Marthe Cousineau, Des pratiques controversées: la
rencontre entre agents de surveillance et itinérants dans le métro, 11 NOUVELLES
PRATIQUES SOCIALES 25, 34–37 (1998).
209. See Waldron, supra note 10, at 304–06.
210. Repression (and Resistance), supra note 179, at 810, 816.
211. See Sylvestre & Bellot, supra note 10, n.85.
212. COMMISSION DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE ET DES DROITS DE LA JEUNESSE,
LA JUDICIARISATION DES PERSONNES ITINÉRANTES À MONTRÉAL: UN PROFILAGE
SOCIAL. FICHE 4: PORTRAIT DE LA SUR JUDICIAIRSATION DES PERSONNES
ITINÉRANTES À MONTRÉAL” 3 (Montreal, 2009), http://www.cdpdj.qc.ca/publications/
Fiche_4_portrait_surjudiciarisation.pdf [https://perma.cc/234H-AMSQ] [hereinafter
UN PROFILAGE SOCIAL]; Dominique Bernier et al., LA JUDICIARISATION DES
PERSONNES EN SITUATION D’ITINÉRANCE À QUÉBEC: POINT DE VUE DES ACTEURS
SOCIO-JUDICIAIRES ET ANALYSE DU PHÉNOMÈNE, 25-8 (The Canadian Homelessness
Research Network Press: Toronto, 2011).
213. CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA R.S.C. c C-26 § 175(1)(c) (1985) (Can.).
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ordering them to move.214 Some researchers have noted that in an
effort to avoid interactions with the police or tickets, homeless
persons in Montreal leave public areas voluntarily when they see the
police or special constables.215 Access to alternatives to loitering is
limited by other logistical realities. For example, the city of Montreal
installed benches offering only enough space for one person to sit.216
Spending one’s time in a shelter during the day is not a solution, as
they are closed at different points, and when they are open, they have
a limited capacity.217
My concern is that the culmination of loitering prohibitions,
property law rules, and the configuration of the urban landscape
impacts the homeless in a unique way.218 First, it reduces their ability
to relax and exercise their autonomy in ways that do not affect those
with access to housing. We rightfully recognize the importance of
being able to relax for the sake of our mental and physical health.219
Perhaps one can even construe relaxation as being a fundamental
capability necessary to have a minimum standard of living, either
encompassed within the notion of play or substantially similar to it.220
We can conceptualize relaxation as the exercise of a person’s
preference to do or not do something, in such a way that they have a
sort of ownership of a moment in time which is insulated from the

214. Marie-Eve Sylvestre et al., Le droit est aussi une question de visibilité:
l’occupation des espaces publics et les parcours judiciaires des personnes itinérantes à
Montréal et à Ottawa, 26 CAN. J. L. & SOC’Y 531, 543–45 (2011).
215. Céline Bellot & Marie-Marthe Cousineau, Le métro: espace de vie, espace de
contrôle, 20 DÉVIANCE ET SOCIÉTÉ 377, 382 (1996).
216. Repression (and Resistance), supra note 179, at 810–11. Regarding the

implementation of rules that prevent people from sitting on benches in the Montreal
subway system, see Yves Poirier, Des bancs contre les sans-abris?, (TVA Nouvelles:
Mar. 30, 2015), http://tvanouvelles.ca/lcn/infos/regional/montreal/archives/2015/03/
20150330-173600.html [https://perma.cc/4HTA-ED2Q].
217. See Sylvestre & Bellot, supra note 10. For example, the Welcome Mission
Hall only has a capacity of roughly 200 beds, and additional space for 200 persons in
the cafeteria, although it is open twenty-four hours per day. See Men’s Services,
WELCOME HALL MISSION (2016), http://welcomehallmission.com/services/mensservices/ [https://perma.cc/PAD2-ZQB8]. The Old Brewery Mission’s Cafe Mission
is only open on weekdays between 8 AM and 4 PM, and can accommodate roughly
150
people.
See Café Mission, OLD MISSION BREWERY (2016),
http://www.oldbrewerymission.ca/en/programs-services/emergency/cafe-mission/
[https://perma.cc/YLR9-HMQC].
218. See Waldron, supra note 10, at 316.
219. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE L. J. 421, 447
(1980).
220. See Alexander, supra note 172, at 805; NUSSBAUM, supra note 34, at 34.
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unwanted interference of others.221 Relaxation implies that one’s
existence is truly theirs, as they have control over how they use their
bodies and temporarily isolate their own experience from unwanted
intrusions, without having this choice constrained by others, judging it
to be unworthy of consideration or respect.222 An inherent aspect of
the ability to relax is to be able to make use of one’s time without
having to constantly fear that the exercise of one’s preference for
relaxation will unexpectedly be interrupted by others.
The problem with the combined application of narrowly-tailored
laws prohibiting loitering is that they cumulatively restrict the ability
of the homeless to relax. These laws affect people with access to
housing less because they can relax or do whatever would amount to
loitering on their private property without the risk of being penalized
for it. Furthermore, the fact that people have access to housing
means that they do not have to worry about somebody granting them
permission to relax in their homes. So, even if the law progressively
eliminates the duration of time they can remain in certain public
places, their homes provide them with the opportunity to relax as
they wish while still obeying the loitering laws. The same is not true
for the homeless. The combined threat of expulsion from private
property and of being ticketed for loitering in public places removes
not only the opportunity to relax as part of their public existence, but
also the ability to do so without having to worry about moving
elsewhere.

2.

Police Discretion and the Combined Effect of Different Laws

In some cases, individual laws may objectively be possible to obey,
but the broad use of police discretion may make it extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to avoid breaking certain laws. Quality of life
offenses do not regulate how people sleep, urinate, or relax in the
privacy of their homes. Rather, quality of life offenses regulate the
lawfulness of doing these things in public.223 Because the homeless
live in public, they are constantly in the jurisdiction where quality of
life offenses are enforced. My concern is how difficult it is for the
homeless to obey the litany of different laws governing their daily
public existence when police discretion is broadly used in a

221. See Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 26, 42 (1976).
222. See id.
223. Jeremy Waldron, Property and Community: For Those Who Have Neither, 10
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 161, 174 (2009).
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discriminatory way to displace or punish them, even though the same
laws are not enforced against those with access to housing.
For instance, in Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, one of the city’s
internal memos, describing how a new police task-force was formed
with the specific objective of dealing with the city’s homeless
population, was adduced as evidence.224 It described how the mission
of the task force was to “move all vagrants and their paraphernalia
out of Santa Ana by continually removing them from the places that
they are frequenting in the City.”225 Similarly, in Pottinger v. City of
Miami, internal memos revealed the city’s policy of “driving the
homeless from public areas.”226 These memos included “elimination
of food distribution as [a] strategy to disperse [the] homeless.”227
Police discretion also played a central role in dispersing the
homeless from parts of Miami. Notably, at one point, the police
stopped enforcing an ordinance which prohibited sleeping in public
where a similar ordinance in the nearby city of Clearwater was struck
down as unconstitutional.228 But this did not prevent the police from
arresting homeless people for sleeping in public. Arrest records,
adduced as evidence at trial, demonstrated that the police used a
combination of park-closure, trespass, and loitering laws as a means
to achieve the same end.229 There have been similar complaints of
discriminatory enforcement in other contexts. For instance, in a study
involving roughly 240 street youth in Toronto, Gaetz and his
colleagues observed that nearly one third of the participants
complained of being ticketed when they had not committed an
offense.230
As Professor Livingston argues, “[t]he problem with the quest for
‘rules’ in the formulation of public order laws and their application is
that the task of maintaining order is itself inherently one of
judgment.”231 After all, there are insufficient resources for the police
to address every single instance where a quality of life offense is

224. Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1177 (Cal. 1995).
225. Id.
226. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1561 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1558 n.8 (citing Hershey v. City of Clearwater, 834 F.2d 937, 940 (11th
Cir. 1987)).
229. Id. at 1566.
230. Bill O’Grady, Stephen Gaetz & Kristy Buccieri, Policing Street Youth in
Toronto, YOUTH HOMELESSNESS IN CANADA: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND
PRACTICE 345 (Stephen Gaetz et al. eds., 2013).
231. Livingston, supra note 179, at 613.
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committed.232 This means that the police must necessarily use their
judgment regarding when and how to enforce these types of laws.233
In one scholar’s words:
What begins to emerge is a model for law enforcement and
police behavior quite at odds with that implicit in the bare
bones of legislative enactment. A realistic conceptual scheme,
at a minimum, must take into account the following premises:
while the legislature defines the outer limits of proscribed
conduct, the police department defines the actual limits. Within
the actual limits, the police department—or worse, individual
policemen—decides which laws shall be enforced actively and
which passively.234
The difficulty that the homeless have in consistently obeying the law
is that they are routinely exposed to the judgment of those applying
the law because they are constantly in the jurisdiction where quality
of life laws are enforced, and so many of their behaviors are
regulated. When the homeless move, they are subject to selectively
enforceable pedestrian and traffic safety laws, such as rules against
jaywalking, even though the laws are less often enforced against nonmarginalized persons who often break these laws right in front of
police officers.235 When the homeless are stationary, whether sitting
or lying somewhere to rest or eat, they are subject to laws prohibiting
obstruction of sidewalks, loitering, or littering which are
disproportionally applied to them.236 Sleep is even regulated by laws
governing the usage of public spaces,237 park closures,238 anti-sleeping
or camping laws,239 and transformations of the urban landscape.240
232. David Cole, Foreword, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A
Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1064 (1999).
233. Id.
234. Joseph H. Tieger, Police Discretion and Discriminatory Enforcement, 1971

DUKE L.J. 717, 721 (1971).
235. See Foscarinis, supra note 50, at 19; Sylvestre & Bellot, supra note 10, at 172
(citing Christine Campbell & Paul Eid, supra note 158, at 90-96); see also Mary I.
Coombs, The Constricted Meaning of “Community” in Community Policing, 72 ST
JOHN’S L. REV. 1367, 1369–71 (1998).
236. Kathryn Hansel, Note and Comment, Constitutional Othering: Citizenship

and the Insufficiency of Negative Rights-Based Challenges to Anti-Homeless
Systems, 6 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 445, 447 (2011).
237. See, e.g., Montreal, Que., By-Law R-036, 2014 (Can.) (governing the legality

of sleeping in subway stations, bus shelters, or aboard subway trains).
238. Repression (and Resistance), supra note 179, at 810.
239. See generally Ades, supra note 63.
240. Mike Davis, Afterword - A Logic Like Hell’s: Being Homeless in Los
Angeles, 39 UCLA L. REV. 325, 331 (1991) (providing examples of implementing
sprinkler systems in parks or constructing “bum-proof” benches).
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Professor Sylvestre has argued that the more publicly visible the
homeless are, the more likely they are to be punished by a variety of
laws they cannot avoid breaking.241 For example, in Skid Row, Los
Angeles, which is known for its highly visible homeless population of
between 11,000 and 12,000 people,242 a recent report concluded that
“the odds of a person receiving a pedestrian citation are between 48
and 69 times greater in Skid Row than in the rest of the City.”243
A brief survey of how laws have selectively been enforced against
the homeless also demonstrates that where there is the will to
penalize the homeless for behaviors related to their daily existence, or
at least force them to move elsewhere, there is a way. A few
examples demonstrating the ingenuity in applying such ordinances
include citing homeless persons for “littering” when they placed a
cardboard box beneath them to sleep,244 ticketing homeless persons
for sitting on top of a picnic table instead of at it,245 unjustifiably
ticketing homeless people in Toronto for provincial offenses despite
insufficient evidence to warrant a citation,246 and disproportionately
issuing jaywalking citations to disabled homeless persons who could
not cross the street in time with their canes or walkers.247
IV. THE ROLE OF IMPOSSIBILITY
Thus far, I have explored contexts in which it may be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, for the homeless to obey the law, even
though those with access to housing have no comparable difficulty. In
this Part, I explore what I view to be the legal significance and
241. Sylvestre & Bellot, supra note 10, at 171–72. See also Maya Nordberg, Jails
Not Homes: Quality of Life on the Streets of San Francisco, 13 HASTINGS WOMEN’S
L. J. 261, 276 (2002); UN PROFILAGE SOCIAL, supra note 212, at 10.
242. Jones v. City of L.A., 444 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 2006).
243. Ellen Reese, Geoffrey Deverteuil, and Leanne Thach, ‘Weak-Center’

Gentrification and the Contradictions of Containment: Deconcentrating Poverty in
Downtown Los Angeles, 34 INT. J. URB. REG. RES. 310, 319 (2010) (citing GARY

BLASI ET AL., POLICING OUR WAY OUT OF HOMELESSNESS? THE FIRST YEAR OF THE
SAFER
CITIES
INITIATIVE
ON
SKID
ROW
6
(2007),
http://www.ced.berkeley.edu/downloads/pubs/faculty/wolch_2007_report-cardpolicing-homelessness.pdf [https://perma.cc/T42L-RL4Y]).
244. Coombs, supra note 235, at 1374.
245. Sylvestre & Bellot, supra note 10, at n.85.
246. Stephen Spencer Davis, Toronto Cop Preyed on Vulnerable People in Fake
Ticket Scheme, TORONTO STAR (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/
2015/11/05/toronto-cop-preyed-on-vulnerable-people-in-fake-ticket-scheme.html
[https://perma.cc/NM2Z-75AU].
247. NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, CRIMINALIZING CRISIS: THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 35 (2011) [hereinafter
CRIMINALIZING CRISIS].
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consequences of the fact that some laws are practically impossible for
the homeless to avoid breaking. In particular, I argue that although
the homeless often invoke the necessity defense in such
circumstances, it is far from an ideal mechanism of remedying their
consistent lack of opportunities to obey the law. Instead, it would
generally be preferable to invoke the issue of impossibility to obey
the law in three principal contexts: stimulating policy change,
constitutionally challenging the legality of certain laws, and acquiring
injunctions enjoining the enforcement of laws that the homeless
cannot consistently obey.
A. Why Defenses of Necessity Should Generally Not Be Invoked
Despite Impossibility
Some have argued in favor of the homeless invoking the defense of
necessity for prohibited life-sustaining conduct they cannot avoid,
such as sleeping in public.248 In a few cases, the defense has
succeeded.249 In other cases, courts have rejected it.250 Generally
248. Donald E. Baker, Comment, “Anti-Homeless” Legislation: Unconstitutional
Efforts to Punish the Homeless, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 417, 452–53 (1991) (advocating

the invocation of the necessity defense against anti-public sleeping ordinances); Tony
Naro, Defending Against a Two-Front Attack: Homeless Persons Use of the
Necessity Defense to Combat Nature and the Law, 63 GUILD PRAC. 158, 158–59
(2006) (advocating the defense of necessity through the use of access to private
property when nature and the elements threaten a person’s well-being). See generally
William Heffernan, Social Justice/Criminal Justice, FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW (William
C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000) (advocating the possibility of a social justicebased claim of justification and its application through formal channels such as the
Model Penal Code’s necessity defense, and through informal channels such as jury
nullification and prosecutorial discretion); Smith, supra note 6 (proposing that
although the invocation of the necessity defense is possible, perhaps a defense of
duress is preferable).
249. See In re: Eichorn, 81 Cal. Reptr. 2d 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (accepting the
defense of necessity against the conviction of an ordinance which prohibited sleeping
in public, where there was insufficient shelter space); Fasanelli, supra note 129; see
also People v. Porter, No. T0212669M (Cal. Super. Ct. 2005) (accepting a defense of
necessity against an ordinance punishing sleeping in public when the homeless shelter
was temporarily closed for budgetary reasons); People v. Robinson, No. T0304959M
(Cal. Super. Ct. 2003) (accepting the defense of necessity against a public camping
ordinance because of the lack of shelter spaces in proportion to the number of
homeless persons).
250. See, e.g., City of Des Moines v. Webster, 861 N.W.2d 878, 886 (Iowa Ct. App.
2014) (rejecting of the defense of necessity for homeless persons who established
encampments under a bridge in violation of a city ordinance prohibiting the
encroachment of public property belonging to the city); Griffin v. United States, 447
A.2d 776, 778 (D.C. 1982) (defense of necessity denied to a group of homeless men
who failed to prove its required elements, namely “that they had exhausted all other
legal alternatives”); Southwark London Borough Council v. Williams [1971] EWHC
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speaking, practical impossibility ought not to be advanced as the basis
of a defense of necessity for several reasons. First, if one accepts
Waldron’s description of justificatory defenses, they generally apply
only in a particular and extreme circumstance,251 rather than to
general challenges to laws, the values underlying them, or their daily
application.252 An often quoted paradigmatic example of the
necessity defense involves the lost alpinist who breaks into a home to
avoid freezing to death in winter.253 As Waldron explains, if someone
were to invoke the defense of necessity in such a case, such a claim
challenges the over-inclusiveness of breaking and entering or
trespassing laws in a particular instance, rather than the values or
assumptions which govern property law, quality of life offenses, or the
general enforceability of such rules.254 The only claim the lost alpinist
advances is that it is in an exceptional and acute case where the rule is
over-inclusive and it is wrong to be punished because of the lack of
legal and reasonable alternatives.255
On the other hand, in cases in which laws are practically impossible
for the homeless to obey, the basis of challenging such rules is that
breaking the law is generally and continually unavoidable.256
Moreover, because the breach of such rules by the homeless are the
norm rather than the exception, claiming practical impossibility does
not challenge the specific application of the rule to some particular
one-off circumstance; it challenges its general and continued
application to the homeless. The fact that homelessness and its
ensuing violation of laws are chronic rather than acute restricts the
defense of necessity.257

(Ch) 734 (Eng.) (rejecting the defense of necessity after finding that it would open
the floodgates and allow people to take the law into their own hands when due to the
lack of housing available in London, the defendants had squatted in housing owned
by the local housing authority).
251. Marie-Eve Sylvestre, Rethinking Criminal Responsibility for Poor Offenders:
Choice, Monstrosity, and the Logic of Practice, 55 MCGILL L. J. 771, 779 (2010).
252. Why Indigence Is Not a Justification, supra note 12, at 103, 106.
253. See Perka v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232, 249 (Can.).
254. Why Indigence Is Not a Justification, supra note 12.
255. Perka, 2 S.C.R. at 249–50.
256. See e.g., Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“[i]n the absence of any indication that the enormous gap between the number of
available beds and the number of homeless individuals in Los Angeles generally and
Skid Row in particular has closed, Appellants are certain to continue sitting, lying,
and sleeping in public thoroughfares and, as a result, will suffer direct and irreparable
injury from enforcement of section 41.18(d)”).
257. See R. v. Latimer, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3, ¶ 38 (Can.); Why Indigence Is Not a
Justification, supra note 12, at 102; Sylvestre, supra note 251, at 779.
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The other reason for which necessity pleas will likely fail concerns
the channel and method by which claimants challenge the application
of rules. Normally, the appropriate channel to challenge the
application of certain laws or their underlying values is by either
contesting their constitutionality, or appealing to the legislature to
change them, rather than to let defendants take the law into their
hands and attempt to justify their conduct after the fact.258 Indeed,
courts often reject the latter approach.259
Finally, there are pragmatic reasons which weigh heavily against
the invocation of necessity for practically impossible laws applied
against the homeless. Notably, “the homeless are especially unlikely
to possess either the means for asserting such a defense or the
motivation to do so when pleading guilty results in their immediate
release.”260 In the Ninth Circuit’s words in Jones v. City of Los
Angeles: “Homeless individuals, who may suffer from mental illness,
substance abuse problems, unemployment, and poverty, are unlikely
to have the knowledge or resources to assert a necessity defense to a
section [of the law] . . . much less to have access to counsel when they
are arrested and arraigned.”261 Many may not even be aware of the
extent of their rights or how to enforce them.262 Necessity claims
would also do nothing to prevent or remedy cases where the homeless
are arrested or displaced without being ticketed or prosecuted.263
Also, a successful necessity plea will not lead to changes in the law for
a large number of people; it will usually benefit only the individual for
whom the defense was successfully invoked and perhaps “insulat[e]
the ordinance from meaningful review.”264 Where the defense is
invoked for actions that are truly exceptional, rather than constantly

258. See Malcolm Thorburn, Criminal Law as Public Law, PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 33 (R.A Duff & Stuart Green eds., 2011); GEORGE
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 792–94 (1978).
259. See Thorburn, supra note 258. See e.g., City of Des Moines v. Webster, 861
N.W.2d 878, 886 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014); Southwark London Borough Council v.
Williams [1971] EWHC (Ch) 734 (Eng.).
260. Sarah Gerry, Jones v. City of Los Angeles: A Moral Response to One City’s
Attempt to Criminalize, Rather than Confront, Its Homelessness Crisis, 42 HARV.
C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 239, 243 (2007).
261. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1131.
262. See Tamara Walsh, A Right to Inclusion? Homelessness, Human Rights and
Social Exclusion, 12 AUSTL. L. J. HUM. RTS. 185, 190 (2006).
263. Andrew J. Liese, We Can Do Better: Anti-Homeless Ordinances as
Violations of State Substantive Due Process Law, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1413, 1426
(2006); see also Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1553 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
264. Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1175 (Cal. 1995).
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reoccurring, the defense may still have merit.265 For instance, if the
temperature drops below freezing and a person has no choice but to
break into an abandoned building and sleep for the night to avoid
death, the defense can apply in such an extraordinary case.266 But in
cases where homeless individuals cannot avoid consistently breaking
the law by engaging in conduct characteristic of their condition, the
fact that the law is extremely difficult or impossible to avoid breaking
should generally not be used as a foundation for repetitively invoking
the defense of necessity.
B.

Practical Impossibility as the Foundation for Policy Change,
Constitutional Challenges, and Injunctions

1. Impossibility to Obey the Law and Constitutional Challenges
Given the limited use of the defense of necessity for repetitive and
unavoidable breaches of the law for conduct essential to a person’s
existence, invoking the extreme difficulty or impossibility of obeying
the law can serve as the foundation for other means which aim to
better protect the rights of the homeless. These means include
striking down ordinances penalizing conduct that is part of a person’s
daily existence as unconstitutional, preventing the enforcement of
such laws through the issuance of injunctions, and stimulating policy
change through public awareness of issues of practical impossibility.
Invoking the impossibility of obeying the law has successfully been
advanced to lead to laws being struck down as unconstitutional where
cities provide insufficient shelter space but still prohibit sleeping in
public or erecting temporary shelter.267 The principal way that the
finding of impossibility has been established is through reports
documenting the number of homeless persons compared to shelter
spaces and the testimony of experts.268 The advantage of employing
265. Smith, supra note 6, at 500–01.
266. Id.
267. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006);
Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1564, 1577; Anderson v. Portland, No. 08-1447-AA, 2009
WL 2386056, at *7 (D. Or. July 31, 2009) (ruling that an ordinance punishing sleeping
in public and erecting temporary shelters is a violation of the Eighth Amendment
right against cruel and unusual punishment); Abbotsford (City) v. Shantz, [2015]
B.C.S.C. 1909 (Can. B.C.); Victoria (City) v. Adams, [2009] 100 B.C.L.R. 4th, 28
(Can. B.C.).
268. See, e.g., Jones, 444 F.3d at 1121–22 (relying upon the Mayor’s Task Force
Executive Summary to establish the discrepancy between the number of homeless
and available shelter space) (citing L.A. HOUSING CRISIS TASK FORCE, IN SHORT
SUPPLY 6 (2000); MAYOR’S CITIZENS’ TASK FORCE ON CENT. CITY EAST, TO BUILD A
COMMUNITY 5 (1988)); Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1564 (providing an example of a

2016]

HOMELESSNESS

781

such a quantitative analysis to support fundamental rights-based
claims is that it involves minimal abstraction and is a relatively
straightforward means of evaluating whether the law can be
obeyed.269
For this reason, homeless advocacy organizations
encourage the usage of such quantitative evaluations to support
constitutional rights based claims.270 Indeed, where there is a lack of
such empirical evidence to support claims of impossibility, courts may
reject such an argument.271
One recent innovative and low-cost way of determining the
number of homeless persons in order to eventually advance such
claims is by conducting coordinated volunteer-based surveys or
censuses. For instance, in Montreal, the “I-Count” initiative involved
the coordinated efforts of 600 volunteers walking through the streets
of the city in order to count the number of homeless persons.272 The
survey, conducted on March 24, 2015, gathered information including
the number of homeless people who slept outside, in transitional
housing, in shelters, and other places like hospitals and detention
centers.273 It also acknowledged the existence of hidden homeless
city calling in an expert witness to testify to the number of shelter spaces available for
the number of homeless person in the city); Victoria (City), [2009] B.C.C.A. 563,
para. 27 (submitting the 2007 Mayor’s Task Force Report detailing the number of
homeless persons and the availability of shelter space as evidence at trial and calling
experts to testify on the availability of shelter space) (citing MAYOR’S TASK FORCE
ON BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MENTAL ILLNESS, ADDICTIONS AND HOMELESSNESS,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7 (2007), http://www.victoria.ca/assets/City~Hall/Documents/
tskfrc_brcycl_exctvs.pdf [https://perma.cc/YMH5-F7TK]).
269. See Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical
Analysis of Official Efforts to Drive Homeless People from American Cities, 66 TUL.
L. REV. 631, 663 (1992); see also NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NO
SAFE PLACE: ADVOCACY MANUAL, 9–13 (2014) [hereinafter NO SAFE PLACE:
ADVOCACY MANUAL]; How YOU Can Help End Homelessness, NAT’L COAL. FOR
HOMELESS, (Nov. 4, 2013), http://nationalhomeless.org/want_to_help/
THE
[https://perma.cc/X8S2-3WPT] (advocating education as a way to help end
homelessness).
270. How YOU Can Help End Homelessness, supra note 269.
271. See, e.g., Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1362 (11th Cir. 2000)
(refusing to strike down an anti-camping ordinance applicable on public property
because the defendant failed to establish that there were cases where homeless
persons were turned away from shelters due to lack of space); Johnston v. Victoria
(City), [2010] B.C.S.C. 1707, para. 64 (Can.) (denying a motion to strike down as
unconstitutional a law forbidding erecting shelters during the day by failing to
demonstrate the lack of available shelter spaces).
272. See Shari Okeke, Montreal Homeless Census Aims to Identify Often-Hidden
Needs, CBC NEWS (Feb. 18, 2015). See generally ERIC LATIMER ET AL., I COUNT
MTL 2015: COUNT AND SURVEY OF MONTREAL’S HOMELESS POPULATION ON MARCH
24, 2015 (2015), http://ville.montreal.qc.ca/pls/portal/docs/page/d_social_fr/media/
documents/I_Count_MTL_2015_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TVR-QDST].
273. See LATIMER ET AL., supra note 272, at v.
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people who could not be counted in the survey, including those
staying in hotels, motels, or with friends on the night of the survey.274
The survey broke down the number of homeless people according to
certain factors, including gender, birthplace, aboriginality, and the
reasons for which they became homeless.275 The total number of
homeless people counted on the night of the survey was roughly
3000—nearly one-tenth the number of what had previously been
estimated in the decade prior.276 Not only do initiatives like these
help inform local governments of the extent of homelessness so that
they can better address the problem, but they also serve to raise
awareness of homelessness amongst volunteers who participate, as
well as the general public.
The drawback to using impossibility as the basis for a constitutional
challenge to a certain law is the possibility that other laws can be
selectively enforced to fill the vacuum. The evidence tendered in the
Pottinger case provides such an example, as arrest records
demonstrated that trespass, loitering, and park closure ordinances
were used to fill the vacuum left by a law against public sleeping
which ceased to be applied.277 This shows the importance of
obtaining arrest records or statistics regarding the number of citations
issued to the homeless in a given area.278

2.

Impossibility to Obey the Law and the Use of Injunctions

One particularly successful and versatile way to block both the
application of laws targeting the homeless while limiting selective
ticketing and arrests is through the issuance of injunctions enjoining
the police from enforcing certain laws against the homeless except in
narrow circumstances.279 In Pottinger, the plaintiffs represented a
274. See LATIMER ET AL., supra note 272, at v.
275. See id. at 13–25 (finding the most common reasons for becoming homeless
were financial problems and drug or alcohol addiction).
276. See id. at v; see also National Research Project to Find Sustainable Solutions
for Homeless People with Mental Health Issues, MENTAL HEALTH COMM’N OF CAN.
(Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.douglas.qc.ca/news/679?locale=en [https://perma.cc/
6ZBD-ASLD] (estimating Montreal’s homeless population to be between 28,000 and
30,000).
277. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1566–67 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
278. See NO SAFE PLACE: ADVOCACY MANUAL, supra note 269, at 10–12.
279. See e.g., Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006) (issuing
injunction preventing the enforcement of laws prohibiting sitting and lying on the
sidewalk between certain hours); Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 706 (2d
Cir. 1993) (affirming injunction preventing the police from enforcing an antipanhandling law which had previously been declared unconstitutional); Cutting v.
City of Portland, No. 2:13-cv-359-GZS, 2014 WL 580155, at *11 (D. Me. Feb. 12,

HOMELESSNESS

2016]

783

group of 6000 homeless people in Miami.280 They petitioned the
court to have an injunction issued which prevented the police from
enforcing certain laws prohibiting conduct they could not avoid
engaging in as part of their survival.281 The court granted injunctive
relief leading to the eventual establishment of the “Pottinger
Agreement,” where the homeless could not be arrested or ticketed
for such conduct unless the arresting officers informed the person of
the existence of a shelter, the shelter had available space, and the
homeless person still refused to go there.282
Empirical data concerning the lack of available alternatives to the
homeless, such as shelter spaces, in addition to arrest or citation
records demonstrating disproportional patterns of enforcement
against the homeless, have successfully been invoked in order to have
such injunctions granted.283 Indeed, the NLCHP has encouraged the
acquisition of such statistics through independent reports, public
records, and Access to Information Requests to support the eventual
granting of such relief.284

3.

Impossibility to Obey the Law and Policy Change

Lastly, establishing the impossibility of obeying the law can
stimulate policy change and identify the extent to which homelessness
is currently penalized.
In Seattle, Washington, “trespass
2014) (issuing injunction against an ordinance prohibiting people from soliciting
money while standing on a median); Jefferson v. Rose, 869 F. Supp. 2d 312, 319
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (issuing injunction to prevent police from enforcing an antipanhandling law which had already been declared unconstitutional yet had
nonetheless been used to arrest the homeless); Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1583–84
(granting of injunction preventing the enforcement of laws banning life-sustaining
behavior unless certain conditions are met); Engle v. Municipality of Anchorage, No.
3AN-10-7047CI, at *10 (Alaska Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2011) (issuing a preliminary
injunction preventing the city from conducting police sweeps and destroying the
property belonging to the homeless); see also NO SAFE PLACE: ADVOCACY MANUAL,
supra note 269 (citing relevant cases).
280. Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1553.
281. Id.
282. See History of the Pottinger Agreement, AM .C.L. UNION OF FLA.,
https://aclufl.org/pottinger/history [https://perma.cc/44A5-SNXW].
283. See Jones, 444 F.3d at 1125, 1127 (documenting how nearly four dozen
homeless persons were arrested for violating an ordinance prohibiting sitting or lying
across a sidewalk and would inevitably violate it in the future and introduced
statements by the LAPD Police Chief who stated that such individuals would
repeatedly be arrested if required); Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1566–67 (using arrest
records against the homeless to prove the extent to which they were arrested for
quality of life offenses and for which other offenses were selectively enforced).
284. See e.g., NO SAFE PLACE: ADVOCACY MANUAL, supra note 269, at 10 (putting
forth suggestions).
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admonishments” banned homeless people from accessing private
property open to the public, such as stores, coffee shops, or entire
business complexes.285 At the same time, conduct such as sitting or
lying on sidewalks,286 camping in unauthorized areas,287 and
obstructing sidewalks by making people take evasive action,288 were
all prohibited. Persons who had unlawfully camped in parks or
trespassed after closing hours could be issued orders which banned
them from re-entering, leaving them with few other places to go.289
As the Seattle Times observed, “the homeless are sometimes
penalized for their ‘existence’ not for their ‘behavior.’”290 Following
advocacy initiatives in partnership with the NLCHP to reduce these
restrictions, the city removed the “trespass admonishments” ban in
2010.291 Moreover, the number of citations issued to the homeless has
decreased significantly since that year.292 Advocacy, therefore,
brought about important policy initiatives to make obeying the law
possible.
A similar policy change also occurred in New Brunswick, New
Jersey through advocacy and political pressure. John Fleming, who
begged from a wheelchair carrying a sign that read “Broke—Please
Help—Thank you—God Bless You” was ticketed four times in two

285. CRIMINALIZING CRISIS, supra note 247, at 46. Moreover, persons could even
be banned from entering bus shelters, property belonging to the Department of
Public Transportation, shopping malls, and even hospitals. See KATHERINE BECKETT
& STEVE HERBERT, BANISHED: THE NEW SOCIAL CONTROL IN URBAN AMERICA 74–
76 (2010).
286. See e.g., SEATTLE WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE, § 15.48.040 (2013) (prohibiting
sitting or lying on a sidewalk between 7 AM and 9 PM in the Downtown and other
commercial districts); see also JUSTIN OLSON & SCOTT MACDONALD, WASHINGTON’S
WAR ON THE VISIBLY POOR: A SURVEY OF CRIMINALIZING ORDINANCES & THEIR
ENFORCEMENT 10 (Sara K. Rankin ed., 2015) (noting that conduct such as sleeping in
doorways was prosecuted under trespass provisions).
287. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 18.12.250 (2013).
288. Id. § 12A.12.015(B)(1) (2013). As noted in “related cases” at the bottom of
the offense definition, the ordinance was upheld as constitutional in Seattle v.
Webster, 802 P.2d 1333, 1341 (Wash. 1990).
289. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 18.12.278 (2013); see also SEATTLE,
WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 18.12.250 (prohibiting camping in parks except in
authorized areas); BECKETT & HERBERT, supra note 285, at 73–78.
290. See Taso Longos, Using Imagination to Empower the Homeless, SEATTLE
TIMES (Dec. 24, 2010), http://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/using-imagination-toempower-the-homeless/ [https://perma.cc/HQM2-VN39].
291. CRIMINALIZING CRISIS, supra note 247, at 46.
292. OLSON & MACDONALD, supra note 286, at 15. One notable exception to this
was continued penalization of parking a trailer or camper on the street, in violation of
SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 11.72.430.
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months for panhandling on streets and sidewalks.293 The city
ordinance banned begging “on any street or sidewalk within the city
when not authorized to do so.”294 However, only organizations were
able to obtain permits, which prevented homeless persons from
lawfully being able to beg on the sidewalks or streets.295 Given the
fact that Mr. Fleming was handicapped, it is unclear where he was
supposed to lawfully beg in order to meet his basic needs, because the
act of “repeated[ly] attempting to stop passers-by” in parks, streets,
or any other public place was also penalized.296 Following mounting
media coverage, and a complaint filed by the ACLU and the New
Jersey Coalition to End Homelessness, the city decided to change the
ordinance.297
Reports and research can also act as important ways of informing
different levels of government about the different police and
legislative practices which penalize the homeless, leading to concrete
change.298 For instance, the research of Professor Sylvestre and the
Quebec Human Rights Commission299 regarding the disproportionate
practices of ticketing the homeless for largely unavoidable quality of
life offenses in the city of Montreal has led to several important policy
changes.300 For example, the Montreal police created a unit

293. See ACLU-NJ and Homeless Group Challenge New Brunswick’s
Unconstitutional Ban on Begging, AM. C.L. UNION (Dec. 19, 2014), https://www.aclu-

nj.org/news/2014/12/19/aclu-nj-and-homeless-group-challenge-new-brunswicksunconsti [https://perma.cc/XLL9-6QAJ].
294. See Verified Complaint, at 3, N.J. Coal. to End Homelessness v. City of New
Brunswick (N.J. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.aclu-nj.org/files/8814/1900/
9365/Verified_complaint_for_injuctive_and_declaratory_relief.pdf [https://perma.cc/
X9TM-TNC5] (citing NEW BRUNSWICK, N.J., CODE OF ORDINANCES,
§ 9.04.050(A)(6) (2014)).
295. See id. at 4 (citing NEW BRUNSWICK, N.J., CODE OF ORDINANCES, § 5.32.050
(2014)).
296. See NEW BRUNSWICK, N.J., CODE OF ORDINANCES, §§ 9.08.020(A),
9.08.020(B)(1) (2016).
297. Seth Augenstein, Under Pressure from Homeless Man, New Brunswick
Agrees to Eliminate Its Begging Ban, NJ.COM (Mar. 23, 2015),
http://www.nj.com/middlesex/index.ssf/2015/03/new_brunswick_agrees_to_do_away_
with_begging_ban_u.html [https://perma.cc/R3D2-KGT3].
298. See NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS TO
HUMAN REALITY: A TEN-STEP GUIDE TO STRATEGIC HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY 21
(2014),
https://www.nlchp.org/documents/Human_Rights_to_Human_Reality
[https://perma.cc/GRZ6-TQYE].
299. In Quebec, the human rights commission is referred to as the Commission des
droits de la personne et de la jeunesse (CDPDJ), translated roughly to the Human
and Youth Rights Commission.
300. See generally Sylvestre & Bellot, supra note 10; Campbell & Eid, supra note
158.
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specializing in homelessness which involves pairing police officers
with outreach workers in order to better help the homeless
population while decreasing the number of tickets issued to them.301
The city has also recently designated an ombudsman in charge of
protecting the rights of the homeless and finding solutions to the
problems they routinely face.302
CONCLUSION
I have argued that in three particular contexts, it can be extremely
difficult—if not impossible—for the homeless to avoid breaking the
law, even though people with access to housing would have no such
trouble. First, individual laws may impose comprehensive bans
against certain public behaviors, which the homeless cannot avoid
engaging in as part of their existence. Second, even where the bans
are not comprehensive, the combined effect of property laws and
quality of life offenses may amount to a near comprehensive ban
which can be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to obey.303 Third,
the cumulative effect of the different laws which regulate nearly every
aspect of a homeless person’s public life can be discretionarily
enforced to the point that breaking the law can become an inevitable
part of their existence.
Furthermore, laws which are impossible for the homeless to obey
are objectionable for several reasons. Notably, these types of laws
ignore homeless persons’ capacity for self-determination and demean
their dignity and autonomy in different ways.304 When the homeless
are arrested or punished for laws that are impossible to obey, the
breach of legal rules is treated as if it were a conscientious decision
despite the lack of available alternatives. These types of laws
therefore disregard homeless persons’ capacities as rational agents
301. See Montreal Police Wrote a Record Number of Tickets for Homeless, CTV
NEWS MONTREAL, (Feb. 22, 2012), http://montreal.ctvnews.ca/montreal-police-wrotea-record-number-of-tickets-for-homeless-1.772044 [https://perma.cc/6VAP-ASWP].
For a description of the homelessness unit, see Homelessness—EMRII, SERV. DE
POLICE DE LA VILLE DE MONTREAL (2014), http://www.spvm.qc.ca/en/Pages/
Discover-SPVM/Who-does-what/Homelessness—EMRII
[https://perma.cc/A4JFGPRU].
302. See Montreal’s Homeless to Get Ombudsman in New Year, CTV NEWS (Dec.
18, 2015), http://montreal.ctvnews.ca/montreal-s-homeless-to-get-ombudsman-innew-year-1.2706610 [https://perma.cc/B6TD-C3PB]; see also 2014–2017 MONTRÉAL
ACTIVITY PLAN TO COMBAT HOMELESSNESS; BECAUSE THE STREET IS A DEAD END 9
(2014), http://ville.montreal.qc.ca/pls/portal/docs/page/d_social_fr/media/documents/
plan_action_itinerance_v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9ZP-8ZP4].
303. See Waldron, supra note 10, at 316.
304. FULLER, supra note 7, at 162.
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who assess rules in deciding how to live their daily lives and shape
their futures. These laws may also ignore their limited opportunities
to obey certain rules.305 Laws that are impossible for the homeless to
obey fail to recognize how they are equally deserving of concern or
respect like other members of the community. This is most notably
the case where laws prohibit erecting temporary shelters even though
adhering to such a rule would needlessly expose the homeless to
physical and psychological harm.306 More generally, however, the law
treats their inability to obey the law as something that does not
matter or, perhaps, as an inconsequential trade-off in creating rules
that govern public spaces.
Increasingly, the reality of how difficult it is for the homeless to
obey the law on a consistent basis is being established through the
acquisition of empirical data, such as surveys, reports, police records,
and information obtained through Access to Information requests.307
Moreover, such information is notably being used as the foundation
for constitutional rights based arguments, the granting of injunctions,
and instituting policy changes, to underpin a variety of successful
claims to better defend the homeless against laws they cannot avoid
breaking.
Even though Anatole France famously and accurately remarked
that “the law forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges,” it is
clear that the apparent neutrality of such legislation frequently does
not extend into its application. While laws continue to ban acts such
as sleeping or camping in public for both those with access to housing
and those without it, the difference in ability to obey such a law is
stark. Indeed, the gulf between the two may be as wide as the
difference between doing the possible and impossible.

305. FULLER, supra note 7, at 162; HART, supra note 5, 22–23.
306. Victoria (City) v. Adams, [2009] 100 B.C.L.R. 4th 28, para. 39 (Can. B.C.).
307. See generally O’Grady, Gaetz & Buccieri, supra note 134.

